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Savery: Regulatory Taking

COMMENT
EMINENT DOMAIN BY REGULATION:
DEVELOPING A UNIFIED FIELD THEORY
FOR THE REGULATORY TAKING*

Government can impact private property in two ways. It can
regulate its use through an exercise of the police power in the
interest of health, safety and general welfare, 1 or it can appropriate property for public use through eminent domain proceedings. 2 Eminent domain involves a taking of property for public
use. 3 The police power involves the regulation of property to
prevent its use in a manner detrimental to the public interest;'
The traditional distinction between the scope of the two powers
is reflected in the remedies for their abuse: 6 an eminent domain
taking requires the payment of just compensation under the
Fifth Amendment,6 while regulation under the police power is
• Two major Supreme Court decisions, First English Evangelical Lutheran Church
of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 55 U.S.L.W. 4781 (U.S. June 9,1987) and NoHan
v. California Coastal Commission, 55 U.S.L.W. 5145 (U.S. June 23, 1987), were issued
while this Comment was in the final stages of publication. For a discussion of their
impact on the law of regulatory takings, see infra End Note.
1. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 669 (1893); 1 P. NICHOLS, THE LAW OF EMINENT
DOMAIN, §1.42 (J. Sackman rev. 3d ed. 1985) [hereinafter cited as "NICHOLS").
2. 1 NICHOLS, supra note I, §1.11. According to Nichols, the elements which comprise the power of eminent domain are a) the power to take b) without the owner's consent c) for the public use.
3. 1 NICHOLS, supra note I, §1.11.
4.Id.
5. Gordon, Compensable Regulatory Taking: A Tollbooth Rises on Regulation
Road, 12 REAL EST. L.J. 211, 212 (1984).
6. The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution provides: "[NJor shall
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. Const. amend.
V, cl. 4. The fifth amendment applies to the states through the fourteenth amendment.
Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 160 (1980); Chicago,
B.&Q.R. CO. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 239, 241 (1897).
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tested by a Fourteenth Amendment due process standard and is
subject to invalidation. 7
The distinction between the two powers has broken down.
Limited in pre-Colonial times to the condemnation of private
land for roads,S the power of eminent domain is now used to
enhance community aesthetics. s In Berman v. Parker,I° the
United States Supreme Court sustained the condemnation of a
well-maintained store in a generally blighted area as part of a
redevelopment program. Since his store needed no rehabilitation, and there was therefore no legitimate public purpose for
condemning it, the owner charged that it should not be included
in the redevelopment program. The Court upheld the eminent
domain proceeding on the grounds that the development of a
more attractive community justified taking the plaintiff's property,ll and that public use encompassed spiritual as well as
physical considerations. 12
The notion of what constitutes a legitimate public interest
subject to police power regulation has also expanded. 13 Initially
used to impose height limitations H and to segregate uses, l~ police power regulations are now used for many of the same purposes as eminent domain, including the resolution of aesthetic
problems. Billboard l8 and open space l7 regulations are a familiar
7. The fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution provides: "[N]or
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law .
. . ." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, §1, cl. 2.
8. Note, The Origins and Original S,ignificance of the Just Compensation Clause of
the Fifth Amendment, 94 YALE L.J. 694, 697 (1985).
9. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954).
10. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
11. [d. at 31.
12. [d. at 33.
13. See Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980) (maintenance of open space); Penn
Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (preservation of historical
landmark); Village of Belle Terre v. Borras, 416 U.S. 1 (1973) (preservation of family
values); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1893) (restraint on the production of alcoholic
beverages).
14. Piper v. Ekern, 180 Wis. 586, 194 N.W. 159 (1932).
15. Euclid v. Ambler, 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
16. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 26 Cal. 3d 848, 610 P.2d 407, 164 Cal.
Rptr. 510 (1980), reu'd 453 U.S. 490 (1980). Justice Tobriner, upholding summary judgment against a plaintiff who attacked an ordinance restricting the placement of billboards, warned against succumbing to a bleak materialism and concluded with an Ogden
Nash ditty:
I think that I shall never see
A billboard lovely as a tree.
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result. In Arastra Limited Partnership v. City of Palo Alto,I8
Palo Alto committed itself to the acquisition of open space
around an existing city park. Originally intending to purchase
the land, the City ran into financial problems and placed the
targeted property into an open space zone. The California Court
of Appeals found that the zoning ordinance was invalid because
it plainly intended to achieve eminent domain results. I9 The due
process standard is flexible. 20 Therefore, social and judicial acceptance of expanded regulatory objectives2I frequently immunizes them from constitutional attack. In general, a regulation
need only advance a legitimate state interest and be rationally
related to that interest in order to survive substantive due process attack. 22
The blurring of the lines between what constitutes public
use for eminent domain and what is considered a proper public
welfare objective of the police power23 means that government
purpose can no longer be used to distinguish between the two
powers. They have become functionally interchangeable. 24 The
Supreme Court's recognition that the two powers are coterminus 2Ci demands that they be treated not as separate entities,
but as "two points on a continuum which is the power of governIndeed, unless the billboards fall,
I'll never see a tree at all.
Id. at 886, 610 P.2d at 429, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 532.
17. Arastra Ltd. Partnership v. City of Palo Alto, 401 F. Supp. 962 (N.D. Cal. 1975),
vacated 417 F. Supp. 1125 (N.D. Cal. 1976); Eldridge v. City of Palo Alto, 57 Cal. App.
3d 613, 129 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1976), vacated 24 Cal. 3d 266, 273, 598 P.2d 25, 28, 157 Cal.
Rptr. 372, 375 (1979).
18. 401 F. Supp. 962 (N.D. Cal. 1975), vacated 417 F. Supp. 1126 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
19. Arastra, 401 F. Supp. at 975.
20. Euclid v. Ambler, 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926). Euclid foresaw today's expansion of
the police power in admitting that "Regulations, the wisdom, necessity and validity of
which, as applied to existing conditions, are so apparent that they are now uniformly
sustained, a century ago, or even half a century ago, probably would have been rejected
as arbitrary and oppressive." Id. at 387.
21. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954).
22. Euclid, 272 U.S. at 395; Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 187-88 (1928).
23. Costonis, 'Fair' Compensation and the Accommodation Power: Antidotes for
the Taking Impasse in Land Use Controversies, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1021, 1036 (1975).
24.Id.
25. Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 240 (1984). Seven members of the
Court joined in the Midkiff opinion; Justice Rehnquist dissented, and Justice Marshall
did not take part in the proceedings. The Court repeated its characterization of the
"two" powers in Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1014 (1984).
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ment".28 The tension between the traditional "correlative
view",27 which sees the two powers as "very different",28 and the
more recent approach, which openly admits that they are interchangeable,29 has produced what one writer characterized as
"doctrinal schizophrenia".30 That schizophrenia, coupled with
the eagerness of some state and local governments to use the
police power as a less expensive alternative to eminent domain,3t
has, in turn, produced a judicial crisis: if government has exercised the police power for a condemnatory purpose, i.e., to extract a public use, then Fifth Amendment compensatory, not
Fourteenth Amendment equitable, remedies are appropriate.
As early as 1871, some courts recognized that a taking could
occur without formal condemnation. 32 Judicial recognition of the
regulatory taking is now widespread,33 but courts remain reluctant to find compensable takings. 34 Many are inclined to treat
alleged regulatory takings as an improper exercise of the police
power,3G ignoring their condemnatory overtones. Such courts
26. Berger and Kanner, Thoughts on the 'White River Junction Manifesto': A Reply to the 'Gang of Five's' Views on Just Compensation for Regulatory Takings of
Property, 19 Loy. L. REV. 685, 724 (1986). See also Bauman, The Supreme Court, Inverse Condemnation and the Fifth Amendment: Justice Brennan Confronts the Inevitable in Land Use Controls, 15 RUTGERS L.J. 15, 33 (1983). Bauman feels that there is "a
consistent constitutional scheme ... in which regulating and taking are merely polar
ends of the entire spectrum of governmental power."
27. Costonis, supra note 23, at 1035.
28. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 669 (1893).
29. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 240: "The 'public use' requirement is thus coterminus with
the scope of a sovereign's police powers." Accord Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S.
986, 1014 (1984).
30. Coston is, supra note 23, at 1047.
31. See Arastra Ltd. Partnership v. City of Palo Alto, 401 F. Supp. 962 (N.D. Cal.
1975), vacated 417 F. Supp. 1125 (N.D. Cal. 1976). The City of Palo Alto received information on the use of zoning as an alternative to eminent domain in public hearings. Id.
at 974.
32. Pumpelly v. Green Bay Company, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166, 179 (1871).
33. MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 106 S. Ct. 2561 (1986); Williamson Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 105 S. Ct. 3108 (1985); Ruckelshaus v.
Monsanto Co., 476 U.S. 986 (1984); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980);
Prune Yard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980); Kaiser Aetna v. United
States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979); Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979); Penn Central Transp.
Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); United States v. Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S.
155 (1958); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). MacDonald, Williamson, Agins and Penn Central apply the principle to land use regulations.
34. Although the United States Supreme Court acknowledged the theoretical existence of a regulatory taking in 1922 in Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. 393, the Court has
never found a compensable taking. See supra note 33.
35. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1893); Agins v. Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598
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have been willing to excuse regulations which in effect "took"
seventy-five percent,86 eighty-seven percent37 and even arguably
one hundred percent88 of the underlying property value. Other
courts treat police power takings as hybrids, viewing them as excessive but legitimate regulations which become, at some undefined point, condemnatory.89 Still others avoid dealing with the
taking issue by finding taking claims premature because administrative remedies have not been exhausted,·o or by abstaining.· 1
Those courts which are willing to find compensable takings· 2 seldom agree on compensation,·8 acknowledging that eminent doP.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1979); Fred F. French Inv. Co. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y.
2d 587, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5, 350 N.E.2d 381 (1976).
36. Euclid v. Ambler, 272 U.S. 365, 384 (1926).
37. Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 405 (1915).
38. Just v. Marinette, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W. 2d 761 (1972). The Just court found
that a county shore lands ordinance did not depreciate the value of the plaintiff's land
because it was in its natural state. It held that depreciation could not be based on possible uses, but on the existing condition of the property, and that value based on changing
the character of the land was not an essential or controlling factor in evaluating a taking
claim. Id. at 23, 201 N.W.2d 771.
39. The Supreme Court articulated the classic view of the so-called continuum approach to regulatory takings in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415
(1922): "The general rule at least is, that while property may be regulated to a certain
extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking." Although the California Supreme Court tried to distinguish Justice Holmes' comments as an indication of the
point at which due process was violated, most courts have interpreted them as indicating
that, at some point, a regulation becomes an exercise of eminent domain. See cases cited
supra note 33.
40. See MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 106 S. Ct. 2561 (1986);
Williamson Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 105 S. Ct. 3108 (1985); and Agins v.
City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980). See also Prince George's County v. Blumberg, 288
Md. 275, 418 A.2d 1155 (1980). Although the owner was entangled in a multi-agency
administrative maze, the court held that the burden of exhausting each agency's individual remedies did not excuse the owner's failure to do so. Id. at 292-94, 418 A.2d 1165.
41. For a discussion of the alleged abuse of the abstention doctrine in the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals, .~ee Berger and Kanner, supra note 26, at 694-95.
42. See, e.g., Zinn v. State, 112 Wis. 2d 417, 334 N.W.2d 67 (1983); Sheerr v. Evesham Township, 184 N.J. Super. 11, 445 A.2d 46 (1982); Ventures in Property Inv. v.
City of Wichita, 225 Kan. 698, 594 P.2d 671 (1979); City of Austin v. Teague, 570 S.W.2d
389 (Tex. 1978); Eldridge v. City of Palo Alto, 57 Cal. App. 3d 613, 129 Cal. Rptr. 575
(1976), vacated 24 Cal. 3d 266, 273, 598 P.2d 25, 28, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372, 375 (1979);
Keystone Associates v. Moerdler, 19 N.Y. 2d 78, 278 N.Y.S.2d 185, 224 N.E.2d 700
(1966).
43. Contrast Arastra Ltd. Partnership v. City of Palo Alto, 401 F. Supp. 962, 982
(N.D. Cal. 1975), vacated 417 F. Supp. 1125 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (city ordered to pay the fair
market value of fee title, not easement value), and Sixth Camden v. Evesham Township,
420 F. Supp. 709, 729, (D.N.J. 1976) (temporary damages awarded on the basis of the
fair rental value of the property).
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main standards for just compensation do not easily apply to
regulatory takings."
The search for regulatory taking standards has been compared to the physicist's .hunt for the quark.4!! Because of the
clear constitutional mandate that just compensation be paid
when land is taken for public use,46 it is critical that the courts
promulgate clear regulatory taking standards and establish uniform criteria for valuing the compensation due. Development of
a unified field theory for takings is imperative: nothing less than
the Constitution demands that we find the quark.
I. THERE IS NO CLEAR STANDARD FOR THE REGULA-

TORY TAKING
James Madison, who wrote the Fifth Amendment, intended
the clause to apply only to direct physical takings of property by
the federal government. 47 As a result, the courts are still struggling to apply the physical taking criteria of eminent domain to
regulatory takings.48 Most courts are willing to concede a regulatory taking when physical invasion is involved,49 but beyond
this, there is little agreement regarding taking criteria.
The definition of regulatory taking standards involves four
primary problems, the first being the sheer variety of regulatory
44. See, e.g., Zinn v. State, 112 Wis. 2d 417, 438, 334 N.W.2d 67, 77 (1983) (Abrahamson, J., concurring), where Justice Abrahamson ruefully admitted that, despite the
majority's willingness to find a regulatory taking, the plaintiff would have a hard time
establishing damages since the court was forced, essentially, to value a cloud on title.
45.C. HAAR. LAND-USE PLANNING: A CASEBOOK ON THE USE. MISUSE AND RE-USE OF
URBAN LAND, 766 (3d ed. 1976).
46. See supra note 7. See also San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450
U.S. 621, 654 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (the payment of just compensation is not
precatory).
47. Note, supra note 8, at 711.
48. Compare United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1945) and Fred F. French Inv.
Co. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y. 2d 587, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5, 350 N.E.2d 381 (1976). Causby
found that defendant's overflights effected a physical invasion of plaintiff's airspace,
while Fred F. French found no physical invasion even though plaintiff's private parks
were opened to the public by zoning regulations. Physical invasion often plays a sub rosa
role in court decisions such as Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979), in
which the Army Corps of Engineers was not allowed to force a developer to open a private lagoon to the public, even though the lagoon was connected to navigable waters and
under the Corps' jurisdiction.
49. See Causby, 328 U.S. 256.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol17/iss2/2

6

Savery: Regulatory Taking

REGULATORY TAKING

1987]

203

acts. IIO A second problem arises from the fact that, while regulation can have the same impact as an exercise of eminent domain,1I1 eminent domain taking standards are not directly applicable. The confusion in judicial precedent creates an additional
problem, while a fourth, and final, problem arises from the
quicksilver nature of regulation itself: revocable, amendable and
endlessly flexible.
The police power's broad basis of legitimacy in health,
safety, general welfare and morals results in a hard-to-categorize
array of regulatory acts. 1I2 In a land use context, the police power
can be exercised to segregate residential and industrial areas,IIS
extinguish noxious uses ll4 and postpone development,1I1I subject
only to basic substantive and procedural due process limitations.
An act of regulation does not always result in a regulatory taking, while eminent domain proceedings always take property.1I6
As Justice Holmes noted in Pennsylvania Coal Company v.
Mahon: 1I7
Government could hardly go on if to some extent
values incident to property could not be diminished without paying for every such change in the
general law. As long recognized, some values are
enjoyed under an implied limitation, and must
yield to the police power. liS

In eminent domain proceedings, title passes to the govern50. See, e.g., Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962) (prohibition of gravel
extraction below the water table); Zinn v. State, 112 Wis. 2d 417, 334 N.W.2d 67 (1983)
(state Department of Natural Resources ruling regarding ordinary high water mark);
Agins v. Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1979) (imposition of
open space restrictions); Cordeco Development Corp. v. Santiago Vasquez, 539 F.2d 256
(1st Cir. 1976) (local government refused to issue a sand extraction permit).
51. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 652 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
52. 1 NICHOLS, supra note 1, §1.42; Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1893).
53. Euclid v. Ambler, 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
54. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1893). See also Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369
U.S. 590 (1962), and Spur Industries, Inc. v. Del E. Webb Development Co., 108 Ariz.
178,494 P.2d 700 (1972).
55. Golden v. Planning Bd., 30 N.Y. 2d 359, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138, 285 N.E.2d 291
(1972).
56. Hagman, 33 LAND USE LAW & ZONING DIGEST 5 (May, 1981).
57. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
58. [d. at 413.
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ment, which appropriates the land for public use.1i9 Ordinarily,
an act of regulation neither transfers title to the government,
(although it may result in a de facto transfer of ownership),60
nor confers the right to use or possession of private property to
the government. 61
Eminent domain criteria are not decisive in most regulatory
taking cases. Early cases quickly recognized that, even absent
formal eminent domain proceedings, a de facto condemnation
could occur.62 These cases generally relied on finding governmental acts which resulted in a physical invasion of property.63
The physical invasion standard, while useful,64 does not resolve
the regulatory taking issue. A regulation may deprive an owner
of the use and benefit of land without conferring any rights of
possession or use on the public. 61i
59. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981); see also
Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954).
60. See Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290 (1967); see also Zinn v. State, 112 Wis.
2d 417, 334 N.W. 2d 67 (1983), in which a state Department of Natural Resources ruling
regarding the location of the ordinary high water mark effectively transferred 200 acres
of plaintiff's lakefront property to the state.
61. See Fred F. French Inv. Co. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y. 2d 587, 385 N.Y.S.2d
5,350 N.E.2d 381 (1976), however, where New York City placed two private parks into a
special park district and opened them to the public.
62. Inverse condemnation is the appropriate remedy in such cases. The owner is
permitted to bring suit against the government for just compensation if his property is
taken or damaged for public use and no eminent domain proceedings have been instituted. See United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 257 (1980). In California, the remedy is
frequently sought where government activity produces landslides which affect land that
has not been condemned. See, e.g., Souza v. Silver Development Co., 164 Cal. App. 3d
165, 210 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1985); Yee v. City of Sausalito, 141 Cal. App. 3d 917, 190 Cal.
Rptr. 595 (1983).
63. See United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1945), which found that bomber
overflights from a military airport "took" the plaintiff's property. In finding the taking,
the court first decided that the owner had a cognizable property interest in as much
airspace as he could reasonably use in connection with his on-ground activities. [d. at
264. The court then found that that airspace had been invaded by the overflights, which
constituted a taking because they were a direct and immediate interference with the
owner's use and enjoyment of his land. [d. at 264-65.
64. See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 180 (1979). In Kaiser, the Supreme Court struck down a lower court ruling that a private developer's ocean channel
had turned its marina into navigable federal waters open to the public.
65. The so-called "open space" easements are a prime example. Although the
owner's use is restricted in order to prevent development, the public seldom acquires an
affirmative right to use the property. But see Arastra Ltd. Partnership v. City of Palo
Alto, 401 F. Supp. 962 (N.D. Cal. 1975), vacated 417 F. Supp. 1125 (N.D. Cal. 1976), for
an example of an ordinance which apparently contemplated "forcing" recreational use of
private property by using the open space designation. The battle over the Palo Alto,
California, foothills has been a source of considerable litigation. See also Eldridge v. City
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The case law on regulatory takings is inconsistent. At the
federal level, taking standards vacillate between two primary
philosophical strains: the so-called proprietary interest test66 established by Justice Harlan in Mugler v. Kansas 67 and the more
flexible continuum test 68 announced by Justice Holmes in Pennsylvania Coal Company v. Mahon. 69 In Mugler, Justice Harlan
rejected a due process challenge to a Kansas dry law which prohibited the manufacture of beer for sale. 70 Justice Harlan
warned that an exercise of the police power was never a taking
or compensable since it was totally distinct from the power of
eminent domain. 71 The ordinance in question, he held, was a legitimate exercise of the police power because it abated a nuisance 72 and did not involve physical invasion or appropriation of
the property by the government. 7S For Justice Harlan, there was
a qualitative difference between the police power and the power
of eminent domain. 7 •
Twenty-nine years later, in Pennsylvania Coal Company v.
Mahon, Justice Holmes rejected Justice Harlan's view that the
two powers were distinct and theorized that a regulation that
went "too far" could be recognized as a taking,76 finding a quantitative rather than a qualitative difference between the powers.
Justice Holmes' continuum test and Justice Harlan's proprietary
interest test, like oil and water, do not mix well.
of Palo Alto, 57 Cal. App. 3d 613, 129 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1976), vacated 24 Cal. 3d 266, 273,
598 P.2d 25, 28, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372, 375 (1979), where an intermediate appellate court
found a compensable regulatory taking. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393
(1922) is arguably another example of the fact that a regulation can "take" land without
conferring any affirmative benefit on the public. The benefit conferred by the Kohler Act
in that case - the support pillars - would have devolved on the private property owners,
not the public.
66. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1893). Justice Harlan felt a regulation could
never be a taking as there was no governmental invasion or appropriation. [d. at 668-69.
See also Fred F. French Inv. Co. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y. 2d 587, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5,
350 N.E.2d 381 (1976).
67. 123 U.S. 623 (1893).
68. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
69. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. 393.
70. Mugler, 123 U.S. at 654-56.
71. [d. at 668-69.
72. [d. at 662.
73. [d. at 668-69.
74. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 39 (1964).
75. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
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In 1984, Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff6 placed the
Supreme Court squarely in the Holmes camp.77 However, the
ongoing conflict between the two judicial strains has spawned a
perplexing ambiguity in present state and federal court standards for regulatory taking. 78 Some courts continue to rigidly
distinguish between regulation and appropriation, holding that
the only remedy for an improper exercise of the police power is
invalidation under the Fourteenth Amendment as a taking of
property_ without due process. 79 Others more readily find compensable takings,80 even when the ordinance in question survives
due process scrutiny.81 Still others agree that a regulation can
effect a Fifth Amendment taking, but insist that compensation
is due only if the taking is permanent. 82 The result is a "serbonian bog".83 Modifications in the federal taking standard further
complicate the equation. Justice Holmes attempted to provide a
yardstick for measuring the "too far" he referred to in Pennsylvania Coal by noting that diminution of property value was one
factor for consideration. 84 When diminution reached a certain
magnitude, an exercise of eminent domain and compensation
were required to sustain the regulatory act. 86 The Penn Central 86 decision expanded Justice Holmes' test into a threepronged inquiry into the impact of the regulation on the claimant, the degree of interference with distinct investment-backed
expectations, and the character of the governmental action,
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

467 U.S. 229 (1983).
Id. at 240. Accord Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1014 (1984).
Sax, supra note 74, at 42.
See Agins v. Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1979).
Burrows v. City of Keene, 121 N.H. 590, 432 A.2d 15 (1981).
81. See Eldridge v. City of Palo Alto, 57 Cal. App. 3d 613, 129 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1976),
vacated 24 Cal. 3d 266, 273, 598 P.2d 25, 28, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372, 375 (1979). In Eldridge,
the landowner conceded that the ordinance was a valid exercise of the police power, but
insisted it effected a taking nonetheless. Id. at 617, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 577. The California
Court of Appeals agreed. Id. at 631-33, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 586-87.
82. See Arverne Bay Construction Co. v. Thatcher, 278 N.Y. 222, 232, 15 N.E.2d
587, 592 (1938).
83. See Comment, Just Compensation or Just Invalidation: The Availability of a
Damages Remedy in Challenging Land Use Regulations; 29 U.C.LA L.REV. 711 (1982).
The author uses the phrase to refer to state approaches to the taking issue, but it is
equally applicable to the federal courts. The phrase has been used in numerous judicial
opinions to describe the "marshlands" where the allegedly separate police power and
eminent domain intersect: City of Austin v. Teague, 570 S.W.2d 389, 391 (Tex. 1978),
Brazos River Authority v. City of Graham, 163 Tex. 167, 176,354 S.W.2d 99, 105 (1962).
84. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
85. Id.
86. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
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including whether it involved physical invasion. 87 The most recent cases appear to have crystallized the three-pronged test
into something of a dogma. 88 In addition, the Court now requires
that a cognizable property interest be taken89 and that the finality requirement be met. 90
'
The problem of defining taking standards is further complicated by the fact that land use regulations are not an "all-ornothing" proposition. 91 Zoning can be changed or invalidated,
regulations amended or revoked. 92 Denial of a particular development plan is not equivalent to an agency's refusal to permit
any development. 93 The impermanence problem clearly troubles
courts struggling to develop a regulatory taking standard. The
Supreme Court appears willing to find a taking despite the impermanence of most land use regulations. 9 ' However, its early
frustration with an applicant's failure to exhaust administrative
remedies 91i has crystallized into a doctrinal insistence on exhaustion as part of the taking standard. 96 Unfortunately, institutionalization of the exhaustion requirement does not clarify what is
final in a land use context. A Rubik's cube of interlocking administrative agencies may provide virtually inexhaustible
though fruitless - opportunities to reapply or appeal.
Superimposing the eminent domain model on an exercise of
the police power does not produce reliable standards for the
87. [d. at 124.
88. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 476 U.S. 986, 1005 (1984); PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 83 (1980); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S.
164, 175 (1979).
89. Ruckelshaus, 476 U.S. at 1000-01; Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130.
90. MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 106 S. Ct. 2561, 2566 (1986);
Williamson Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 105 S. Ct. 3108, 3117 (1985).
91. MacDonald, 106 S. Ct. at 2565.
92. See Berger and Kanner, supra note 26, at 700, who characterize the regulatory
system as "a monumental crap game".
93. MacDonald, 106 S. Ct. at 2565.
94. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 657 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting): "Nothing in the Just Compensation Clause suggests that 'takings'
must be permanent and irrevocable."
95. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 136-37 (1978). The
Court found that the Landmark Preservation Commission's refusal to approve the two
plans submitted did not amount to a blanket denial of any development of the airspace
above the terminal. This finding was an important corollary to its holding that no taking
had been effected. [d. at 138.
96. See MacDonald, 106 S. Ct. at 2566; and Williamson Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 105 S. Ct. 3108, 3117 (1985).
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regulatory taking. Debating the appropriate remedy for an excessive regulation does not provide standards either. As noted in
a recent taking case,97 viewing a regulation that goes "too far" as
a taking or an invalid exercise of the police power does not resolve what "too far" is. 98
II. MODIFICATIONS TO CURRENT REGULATORY TAKING THEORY CAN PRODUCE A WORKABLE STANDARD
Three modifications to current taking theory will help clarify when a taking has occurred: clarification of the property interest at stake, addition of a circumstantial review standard, and
definition of the finality requirement.
A.

THE PROPERTY INTEREST

Property, in a constitutional sense, is not a physical thing,
but a group of rights which the owner of the thing has regarding
it. 99 Although the Constitution requires just compensation for
the taking of property,lOO property interests are not created by
the Constitution, but by existing rules or understandings that
stem from independent sources, including state law. 101
It is not at all clear that economic value is a property interest.102 The community defines propertyl03 and creates property
97. Williamson, 105 S. Ct. 3108.
98. [d. at 105 S. Ct. 3123-24.
99. United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 377-78 (1945).
100. U.S. Con st. amend V, cl. 4.
101. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 476 U.S. 986, 1001 (1984); Board of Regents v.
Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1971). See generally Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of Just Compensation Law, 80 HARV. L.R.
1165 (1967), and Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149
(1971). Michelman advances a utility theory of property. He claims that productivity is
dependent on the existence of reliable rules regarding the relationship of citizens to resources, and that regulation should be compensable only if it has a net demoralizing
impact. Michelman at 1212-13. Sax, on the other hand, adopts a vision of property as a
system of interrelated, competing uses, and feels regulation should be compensable only
if the effects of the regulated activity are contained within the boundaries of the designated property and do not "spillover". Since most uses do have spillover effects, he
would find few regulations compensable. Sax at 150, 161-63.
102. Sax, supra note 74, at 51-53. See also Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 66 (1979):
"[L]oss of future profits - unaccompanied by any physical property restriction - provides
a slender reed upon which to rest a takings claim." Because of its uncertainty, an interest in anticipated gains has traditionally been viewed as less compelling than other prop-
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values. l04 Since, as Justice Holmes observed, some values are
subject to an implied limitation,loll the courts have been chary of
finding that existing value was a property interest for purposes
of the Fifth Amendment. loe Instead of an automatic compensation requirement for any regulatory impact on value, the Supreme Court adopted the "diminution of value" standard, under
which an excess of value must be taken before compensation is
due. l07
Focusing on value as the primary property interest at stake
is misplaced. Justice Brennan wrote in Penn Central that diminution in value alone could not create a taking. l08 The courts
have excused regulatory impacts which almost wholly devalued
property. IDe The value of land arises from its usefulness,11o and
land can be diminished in value without denying all use. l l l In a
regulatory context, the diminution of value is a result of the restriction of use. Therefore, the focus should be on the cause the restriction - not on the diminished value, which is only an
effect. The restriction of use rather than the diminution in value
should be determinative.ll2
erty related interests. Id. at 66.
103. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
104. Fred F. French Inv. Co. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y. 2d 587, 597, 385 N.Y.S.2d
5, 11, 350 N.E.2d 381, 387 (1976).
105. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
106. Andrus, 444 U.S. at 66: "[B)ecause of its very uncertainty, the interest in anticipated gains has traditionally been viewed as less compelling than other property-related
interests. "
107. Pennsyluania Coal, 260 U.S. at 413. See also Golden v. Planning Bd., 30 N.Y.
2d 359, 381, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138, 155, 285 N.E.2d 291, 304 (1972): "Diminution ... is a
relative factor and though its magnitude is an indica of a taking, it does not of itself
establish a confiscation."
108. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 131 (1978); see
also Andrus, 444 U.S. at 66, regarding the insufficiency of loss of future profits to establish a taking.
109. See supra notes 36, 37 and 38.
110. Keystone Associates v. Moerdler, 19 N.Y. 2d 78, 88, 278 N.Y.S.2d 185, 189, 224
N.E.2d 700, 703 (1966), citing Forster v. Scott, 136 N.Y. 577, 584, 32 N.E. 976, 977: "All
that is beneficial in property arises from its use and the fruits of that use, and whatever
deprives a person of them deprives him of all that is desirable or valuable in the title and
possession." See also Piper v. Ekern, 180 Wis. 586, 592, 194 N.W. 159, 162 (1923), and
Fred F. French Inv. Co. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y. 2d 587, 597, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5, 11,
350 N.E.2d 381, 387 (1976).
111. See generally Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130-31.
112. Sheerr v. Evesham Township, 184 N.J. Super. 11, 54, 445 A.2d 46, 69 (1982).
See also Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130-31 (diminution in value alone is not a taking; the
court must focus on remaining permitted uses). Accord Zinn v. State, 112 Wis. 2d 417,
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A regulatory taking does not require deprivation of all use.
The cases seem to draw the line not at deprivation of all use but
at deprivation of profitable use of property. lIS Some courts find
that deprivation of reasonable or beneficial use results in a taking. 1l4 Others couch the taking in terms of deprivation of the
economically viable use of land,tIlI or the right to possess and
exploit.1I6 While it is clear that deprivation of all use is a taking,117 the deprivation of income productive use seems to be the
critical factor. lIS

In Morris County Land Investment Company v. Parsippany-Troy Hills Township,ll9 the New Jersey Supreme Court
invalidated a Meadow Zone Ordinance which restricted the
owner of 66 lowland acres to passive uses such as conservation,
aquaculture and agriculture. 12o Such uses, the court found, were
quasi-public, afforded no financial return to the owner and
amounted to a freeze on use. 121 The court agreed that a
424,334 N.W.2d 67, 70 (1983); Arverne Bay Const. Co. v. Thatcher, 278 N.Y. 222, 232,15
N.E.2d 587, 592 (1938). See San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S.
621, 646-53, (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan seems to refer to deprivation of
use as the equivalent to economic impact on property. [d. at 646-53. The interests are
distinct, but the failure to distinguish them is not unusual and is indicative of the need
to clarify the property interest at stake in a taking case. Permitted uses obviously impact
value, but that does not mean the two property interests are identical. See Bauman,
supra note 26, at 31.
113. Note, Money Damages for Regulatory Takings, 23 NAT. RES. J. 711, 719 (1983).
Contrast Justice Brennan's San Diego Gas test (deprivation of "use and enjoyment", 450
U.S. at 656-57) with the Fifth Circuit's characterization of the standard in Hernandez v.
City of Lafayette, 643 F.2d 1188, 1200 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied 455 U.S. 907 (1982)
(denial of "economically viable use").
114. San Diego Gas, 450 U.S. at 652 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Usdin v. State Dept.
of Environmental Protection, 173 N.J. Super. 311, 323, 414 A.2d 280, 286 (1980); Just v.
Marinette, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 15,201 N.W.2d 761, 767 (1972); Golden v. Planning Bd., 30 N.Y.
2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291 (1972).
115. See Burrows v. City of Keene, 121 N.H. 590, 432 A.2d 15 (1981); Hernandez v.
City of Lafayette, 643 F.2d 1188 (5th Cir. 1980); Arastra Ltd. Partnership v. City of Palo
Alto, 401 F. Supp. 962 (N.D. Cal. 1975), vacated 417 F. Supp. 1125 (N.D. Cal. 1976). The
Burrows case dealt with whether there was a taking under the state constitution.
116. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 262 (1945).
117. United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945); Zinn v. State,
112 Wis. 2d 417, 429, 334 N.W.2d 67, 73 (1983); Morris County Land Inv. Co. v. Parsippany-Troy Hills Township, 40 N.J. 539, 557, 193 A.2d 232, 242 (1963); Arverne Bay Construction Co. v. Thatcher, 278 N.Y. 222, 226, 15 N.E.2d 587, 589 (1938).
118. Fred F. French Inv. Co. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y. 2d 587, 590-91, 385
N.Y.S.2d 5, 7, 350 N.E.2d 381, 383 (1976); Parsippany at 557, 193 A.2d at 242.
119. 40 N.J. 539, 193 A.2d 232 (1963).
120. [d. at 545, 193 A.2d at 236.
121. [d. at 552-53, 193 A.2d at 240.
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regulation was confiscatory when it so restricted use that the
land could not practically be utilized for any reasonable purpose
or when the only permanent uses were those to which the property was not adapted or which were economically infeasible. 122
Admittedly, land in its natural state can still be used. 123 Notwithstanding a minority view which found that restriction to
natural use was not a taking,124 such restrictions seem to be a
compensable Fifth Amendment violation since the public uses
- primarily open space - are so encompassing that they prevent the owner's exercise of his right to use or benefit.126
Although the right to use is already recognized as a property
interest,126 viewing it as a fundamental property interest would
simplify taking standards and valuation. Ordinarily, taking a
discrete property interest, destroying one strand in the bundle of
property rights, does not constitute a takingl27 "because the aggregate must be viewed in its entirety"!28 Taking a fundamental
property right, however, even if it is only a single strand in the
bundle, triggers the Fifth Amendment!29
While the Supreme Court has taken an expansive view of
what constitutes property for taking purposes,130 it has been reticent regarding which property rights are fundamental. 131 It is
clear that the right to exclude is a fundamental property right. 132
122. Id. at 557, 193 A.2d at 242.
123. See Just v. Marinette, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972).
124. Id.
125. Morris County Land Inv. Co. v. Parsippany-Troy Hills Tp., 40 N.J. 539, 555-56,
193 A.2d 232, 241-42 (1963).
126. United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945); Piper v.
Ekern, 180 Wis. 586, 593, 194 N.W. 159, 162 (1923).
127. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31 (1978).
128. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 66 (1979).
129. Id.
130. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 476 U.S. 986 (1984) (trade secrets); Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40 (1959) (business interests, including a security interest in chattels); United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155 (1958) (right
to engage in a particular business); Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 577 (1934)
(interest in insurance contract). See also Johnson, Compensation for Inualid Land Use
Regulations, 15 GA. L.REV. 559, 581 (1981).
131. Johnson, supra note 130, at 569.
132. PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 82 (1980); Kaiser Aetna v.
United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979). See also Ruckelshaus, 476 U.S. at lOll, which
held that the government's disclosure of trade secrets in the process of conducting
FIFRA licensing "took" the right to exclude; such disclosure, the court found, resulted in
loss of the property interest.
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However, it is not clear what other property rights are fundamental since the Supreme Court has not given us any criteria for
making such determinations. 133 However, criteria can be
extracted.
The reason the right to exclude is a fundamental property
right is because it is directly related to an owner's right to use
his property;134 without it, property ownership is meaningless. m
In Prune Yard Shopping Center u. Robins/ 36 the United States
Supreme Court held that forcing a California shopping center to
allow the circulation of petitions on its premises was not a taking because the center failed to show that exclusion of the petitioners was essential to protect the center's usefulness or
value. 137 Based on Prune Yard, it appears that the right to exclude is a fundamental property interest only when it is essential
to maintain use and value, which is based on use. If this is true,
then the right to use is an even more fundamental property interest than the right to exclude. The United States Supreme
Court recognized in 1893 that the adequacy of the protection
given the individual in his use and enjoyment of property is one
of the most certain tests of the character of government. 138 The
right to beneficial use must be recognized as the fundamental
property interest at stake in a regulatory taking. 139
The right to use is a concept which can be manipulated. 140
Uses can be classified as active or passive, present or prospective. In deciding whether the right to use has been taken, courts
generally focus on whether a regulation deprives an owner of all
active uses, not on whether it denies him additional uses. In
Penn Central, Justice Brandeis focused on the existence of remaining permitted uses in evaluating whether a regulatory
133.
134.
135.
136.

Johnson, supra note 130, at 569.
Prune Yard, 447 U.S. at 84.
Berger and Kanner, supra note 26, at 722.
447 U.S. 74 (1980).
137. [d. at 84.
138. Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 324 (1893).
139. Berger and Kanner, supra note 26, at 722, agree: "It should be self-evident
that, of all the rights arising from the concept of property, the right to use property in a
lawful, reasonable, peaceful and profitable manner is the most fundamental." (Emphasis
original).
140. See Just v. Marinette, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972), which held that
enjoyment of shoreline property in its natural state was reasonable use.
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taking had occurred. HI The City of New York denied the Penn
Central Transport Company the right to build in the airspace
above Grand Central Station because of the building's landmark
status." 2 Justice Brandeis, writing for the majority, found that
although the ordinance did not permit development of the airspace, it did not interfere with existing uses which permitted a
reasonable return on Penn Central's investments. I43 In Morris
County Land Investment Company v. Parsippany-Troy Hills
Township,144 however, the New Jersey Supreme Court found
that the owner was restricted to passive conservation uses of his
66 acres of swamp because township ordinances prohibited reclamation. 14~ As a result, the court found that the township had
confiscated the land.148 If the effect of a regulation is to prevent
all active use, then a taking has occurred and compensation is
due. I47
Local government cannot avoid the taking issue by arguing
that a property interest does not exist. Although property rights
arise under rules and understandings stemming from sources
such as state law,148 whether such entitlements exist is a question of federal constitutional law. us
State efforts to limit an owner's right to use may conflict
with the Supremacy ClauseI~o in two ways:
1. Rights to use can arise from sources other than state law.

Board of Regents v. RothI~I indicates that property rights arise
from "sources such as state law."1~2 The case language is an illustrative, not an exclusive, indication of the sources of property
141. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.s. 104, 136 (1978).
142. [d. at 115-18.
143. [d. at 136.
144. 40 N.J. 539, 193 A.2d 232 (1963).
145. [d. at 557, 193 A.2d at 243.
146. [d.
147. [d. at 557, 193 A.2d at 242.
148. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
149. O'Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Center, 447 U.S. 773, 796 (1980) (Blackmun,
J., concurring).
150. Article VI of the United States Constitution provides: "This Constitution ...
shall be the supreme Law of the Land ... any Thing ... in the Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding."
151. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
152. [d. at 577. (Emphasis added).
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rights. A state cannot decide whether or not a property right
arising outside state law exists.
2. Federal and state standards regarding the existence of a
right to use may conflict. For example, the Supreme Court has
indicated that the presence of reasonable or distinct investmentbacked expectations is one of the factors to be considered in
evaluating whether a taking has occurred. I113 The treatment of
the phrase in the case law and legal literature indicates that investment-backed expectations are a property interest. 1M
The Supreme Court's admonition that distinct investmentbacked expectations must be "more than a 'unilateral expectation or an abstract need' "11111 sounds suspiciously like its characterization of property in Board of Regents v. Roth. ll1S Furthermore, since "economic impact on the owner" is treated as a
separate taking inquiry in the more recent cases,1117 the Court
apparently means distinct investment-backed expectations to be
more than mere economic 10SS.1118
A right to use may exist based on the federal "expectations"
standard even though state law does not recognize a property
interest. In California, for example, a developer has no protected
153. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). Accord
Connolly v. Pension Guaranty Corp., 106 S. Ct. 1018, 1026 (1986); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1005 (1984).
154. See Michelman, supra note 101, at 1232-33. Michelman seems to feel that at
some point an owner's expectations of use become a right to use, based on the size and
reasonableness of his investment in those expectations. [d. at 1233. The Michelman article was apparently the source of the Penn Central reference to "distinct investmentbacked expectations." Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124. See Bauman, supra note 26, at 23
n.34.
155. Ruchelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1005, quoting Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v.
Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 161 (1980).
156. 480 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
157. Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 106 S. Ct. 1018, 1026 (1986);
Ruchelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1005.
158. Unfortunately, the Court has done little to clarify when investment-backed expectations are distinct or reasonable. It is unclear, for example, whether reasonableness
is related to the strength of the state's interest or the reasonableness of state law. If the
state's regulatory interest relates to preservation of a flood plain, is the strength of an
owner's investment-backed expectations less than if the state has an interest in open
space? Is the standard for reasonableness higher in a jurisdiction like California where
an owner knows he will have no vested rights until he pulls his permits and completes
substantial work? The parameters of distinct investment-backed expectations are far too
indistinct.
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property interest in a use until the right vests Ui9 - and no vested
right until he pulls his building permits and completes substantial work in reliance on the permits. 160 An owner may have distinct investment-backed expectations in a use long before he
pulls his building permits. Local government cannot abridge
that interest without paying just compensation by arguing that
no property interest exists to be taken. l6l Under the Supremacy
Clause, federal constitutional law governs whether that interest
exists and whether it has been taken. Property rights are protected not because the states give them protected status, but because the Constitution insists on their protection. 162
B.

THE CIRCUMSTANTIAL REVIEW STANDARD

The blurring of the distinction between the eminent domain
and police powers makes the principal legal tests for regulatory
taking inadequate. 163 Justice Harlan's proprietary interest test,
with its emphasis on physical invasion or appropriation, is not
sensitive to land use situations where an owner's use is taken
without the use or fee being transferred to the public. The
Holmes test, which focuses on diminuation in value and treats
the eminent domain and police powers as points on a continuum, and its spin-off, the Penn Central balancing test,164 result
in confusion. 166 Since value is a function of an owner's ability to
use, the Holmes' test focuses on the wrong property interest.
Most courts, under either test, have recognized that regulatory takings are a product of a state's acts, not its expressed
159. Del Mar v. Coastal Comm'n, 152 Cal. App. 3d 49, 52, 199 Cal. Rptr. 225,226·32
(1984); Pescosolido v. Smith, 142 Cal. App. 3d 964, 969·70, 191 Cal. Rptr. 415, 418·19
(1983).
160. Contra Costa Theatre, Inc. v. City of Concord, 511 F. Supp. 87, 89 (D.C. Cal.
1980); Blue Chip Properties v. Permanent Rent Control Bd., 170 Cal. App. 3d 648, 658·
59, 216 Cal. Rptr. 492, 497 (1985).
161. Appellant's Reply Brief at 19·20, MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of
Yolo, 106 S. Ct. 2561 (1986) (No. 84·2015).
162. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, §9·4, at 465 (1978).
163. City of Austin v. Teague, 570 S.W.2d 389, 391 (Tex. 1978).
164. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
165. Bauman, supra note 26, at 24.
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intent.ls8 As the Supreme Court noted in Hughes v. Washington: IS7
[T]he Constitution measures a taking of property
not by what a state says, or by what it intends,
but by what it does. (emphasis original)16S

As a result, many courts are now moving toward a circumstantial
review standard.
The test under the circumstantial standard is whether
"there exists some combination of factors which, in context, convincingly suggest that the cumulative effect of the regulatory
course of conduct has been to work a de facto appropriation of
private property without compensation".189 An exercise of the
police power is presumed valid, and the courts generally defer to
regulatory acts. l7O However, the courts can look at the prior history, nature and scope of the government's behavior in deciding
whether there has been an oppressive confiscation. l71
166. Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290, 298 (1967). In Hughes, the plaintiff challenged a Washington State Statute which would have reversed a common law rule that
accreted ocean-front land belonged to adjacent property owners, not the state. The Supreme Court went on to say that "[aJlthough the State in this case made no attempt to
take the accreted lands by eminent domain, it achieved the same result by effecting a
retroactive transformation of private into public property - without paying for the privilege of doing so." [d. at 298. See also Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438
U.S. 104, 130-31 (1978), citing Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290, 298 (1967): "In deciding whether a particular governmental action has effected a taking, this court focuses.
rather both on the character of the action and on the nature and extent o~ the interference with rights in the parcel as a whole .... "; Arastra Ltd. Partnership v. City of Palo
Alto, 401 F. Supp. 962, 977 (N.D. Cal. 1975), vacated 417 F. Supp. 1125 (N.D. Cal. 1976):
"Distinguishing between the exercise of the two powers is not always easy ... [wJhich of
the powers is being used does not necessarily appear from the form in which the community puts its action." See generally Bauman, supra note 26, at 25, describing "the Supreme Court's consistent pattern of judging the effects of government action rather than
dwelling on the mode of government operation."
167. 389 U.S. 290 (1967).
168. [d. at 298.
169. See Comment, supra note 83, at 738. According to the author, factors relevant
to the consideration of whether the government's course of conduct has effected a taking
would include: repeated public pronouncements of intent to employ the property for
public use, condemnation threats, institution and abandonment of eminent domain actions, inclusion of the property in general zoning plans or studies, its identification as
property targeted for acquisition in a bond or referendum election, its professed utility
in terms of proximity to ongoing public activity, the timing of various regulatory actions,
and variations in taking policy. [d. at 738.
170. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 661 (1887); Arastra Ltd. Partnership v. City of
Palo Alto, 401 F. Supp. 962,979 (N.D. Cal. 1975), vacated 417 F. Supp. 1125 (N.D. Cal.
1976); Golden v. Planning Bd., 30 N.Y. 2d 359, 377, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138, 151, 285 N.E.2d
291, 301 (1972). See also Berger and Kanner, supra note 26, at 706, who feel that under
the coterminus theory of the police and condemnation powers, a regulatory act should
receive as much judicial deference as an exercise of eminent domain.
171. Arastra. 401 F. SUDD. at 979.
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Circumstantial review is not the same thing as the "continuum approach",172 which finds a regulation a taking when it goes
"too far".173 Instead, it broadens the taking inquiry beyond the
regulation and extends it to the impact of the regulation on the
particular piece of property and the entire course of the government's conduct l74 in light of community conditions 1711 and environmental factors.178 It should also incorporate the factors balanced in the Penn Central case: the economic impact on the
property owner and the importance of the state's interest. 177 The
circumstantial standard is already recognized in mlmy of the
federal taking cases,178 and has been applied in state cases as
well. 179 A comparison of three cases illustrates the advantages of
using the circumstantial review standard. In Aruerne Bay Construction Company u. Thatcher,180 the owner of residenth~lly
zoned property applied for a variance to build a gas station. His
application denied, he sued for a taking. 181 The court found that
the ordinance effected a taking because the property was wholly
unfit for residential use: an open sewer was located 1200' from
172. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
173. [d.

174. Comment, supra note 83, at 733.
175. See Arverne Bay Construction Co. v. Thatcher, 278 N.Y. 222, 15 N.E.2d 587
(1938), in which the owner of land zoned residential applied for a variance for a gas
station. The owner and the City's experts agreed that the property couldn't be profitably
. used for residential purposes: there was no residential pressure in plaintiff's area and
would be none for the foreseeable future. Denied a variance, the owner challenged the
ordinance and the court invalidated it on the basis that an ordinance which so impacts
property that it can't be used for any reasonable purpose was a taking.
176. See MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 106 S. Ct. 2561 (1986). In
MacDonald, the plaintiff's land was zoned Agricultural Preserve after he applied for approval of a subdivision map. However, since a foot of topsoil had been removed to build
nearby Interstate 80, and since the land was infested with pests, it was clearly unsuitable
for agricultural uses. Appellant's Brief at 6, MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of
Yolo, 106 S. Ct. 2561 (1986) (No. 84-2015).
177. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
178. "Ad hoc factual inquiry" - MacDonald, 106 S. Ct. at 2566; Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 476 U.S. 986, 1005 (1984); San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450
U.S. 621, 649 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124. "Question
turning upon the particular circumstances of each case" - United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 168 (1958).
179. See Arverne, 278 N.Y. 222, 15 N.E.2d 587. See also Arastra Ltd. Partnership v.
City of Palo Alto, 401 F. Supp. 962 (N.D. Cal. 1975), vacated 417 F. Supp. 1125 (N.D.
Cal. 1976), and Morris County Land Inv. Co. v. Parsippany-Troy Hills Tp., 40 N.J. 539,
193 A.2d 232 (1963). In both cases, the courts found takings based on the entire course of
the government's conduct, not merely on the basis of the regulation in question.
180. 278 N.Y. 222, 15 N.E.2d 587 (1938).
181. [d. at 225, 15 N.E.2d at 589.
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the property line and the City's incinerator had been built
nearby.182 On-site conditions were not likely to change enough in
the future to allow the plaintiff to put the land to profitable
use. 18S Had the effect of the regulation in light of on-site conditions amounted only to a temporary inconvenience, the court
would have been less willing to find a taking. 184
In Golden v. Planning Board of Town of Ramapo,1811 the
Town of Golden adopted an ordinance which potentially stalled
development for 18 years. Although the ordinance was attacked
on due process grounds,186 the court sustained it because, unlike
Arverne's, it did not permanently restrict development: 187 it allowed acceleration of development by owners who were willing
to install capital improvements such as sewer and water and reduced property taxes during the effective period of the
ordinance. 188
The results in jurisdictions which do not use circumstantial
review can be harsh. California, for example, continues to insist
that an exercise of the police power can never effect a taking. 189
In MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo,190 a recent
California case, the owner of a 44-acre parcel located in Yolo
County applied to the County for a subdivision map. The
County denied the application because the property lacked
sewer and water services, had no street access and insufficient
fire and police protection!91 However, these deficiencies were attributable to government action. The nearby City of Davis had
redrawn its street maps to isolate the land and refused dedication of streets the owner agreed to build himself. The County
refused to supply sewer services,192 and delivered the final blow
when it determined that the land could be used only for agricul182. [d. at 230, 15 N.E.2d at 591.
183. [d. at 232, 15 N.E.2d at 592.
184. [d.

185. 30 N.Y. 2d 359, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138, 285 N.E.2d 291 (1972).
186. [d. at 369, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 144, 285 N.E.2d at 296.
187. [d. at 382, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 155, 285 N.E.2d at 304.
188. [d.

189.
190.
191.
Ct. 2561

Agins v. Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372, 598 P.2d 25 (1979).
106 S. Ct. 2561 (1986).
Appellant's Brief at 7, MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 106 S.
(1986) (No. 84-2015).
192. [d. at 6.
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tural purposes.1 9S In light of the fact that a foot of topsoil had
been stripped from the land and it was infested with ineradicable pests, it was clearly unusable for agricultural purposes.1 94
The lower courts found the plaintiff's factual allegations inadequate to state a taking. They went on to hold that, regardless of
such insufficiency, money damages for inverse condemnation
were foreclosed as a matter of California law. 1911 The United
States Supreme Court refused to overturn the state decision because the plaintiff had not exhausted all administrative remedies. 196 Had any of the courts applied the circumstantial review
standard, the result might have been less harsh.
C.

THE FINALITY REQUIREMENT

Judicial relief from a regulatory act is not available until the
prescribed administrative remedies have been exhausted,197 and
a final administrative decision obtained. 198 The absence of a final administrative decision has been fatal in almost all of the
major Supreme Court taking cases in the land use area. 199 The
last two major cases, Williamson Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank 200 and MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of
193. Id. at 7.
194. Id. at 6·7.

195. MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 106 S. Ct. 2561, 2564 (1986).
196. Id. at 2567-68.
197. Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding, 303 U.S. 41, 50-51 (1938).
198. Prince George's County v. Blumberg, 288 Md. 275, 283, 418 A.2d 1155, 1160
(1980). See cases cited infra note 199.
199. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 633 (1981) (The
Supreme Court rejected jurisdiction, holding that there was no final decision in the lower
court as to whether the regulation in question had effected a taking); Agins v. City of
Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260, 262-63 (1980) (Plaintiffs failed to submit a specific development plan, with the result that the Court found there was "as yet no concrete controversy regarding the application of the specific zoning provisions"); Penn Central Transp.
Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 136-37 (1978) (Plaintiff's failure to submit an application for a smaller structure resulted in Court's inability to determine whether all rights
to use airspace above the terminal were denied). See also MacDonald, 106 S. Ct. 2561,
2568-69 (1986) (Plaintiff had received county's response to one subdivision proposal, but
had yet to receive final position regarding application of regulation to his land); Williamson Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 105 S. Ct. 3108, 3117-18 (1985) (Plaintiff failed
to seek variances which would have removed five of the County's eight objections to its
submitted plat).
200. 105 S. Ct. 3108 (1985).
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Yolo201 make it clear that the need for a final administrative
decision has now become part of the taking formula. 202

Although some critics charge that the courts are using the
exhaustion requirement to avoid finding takings,203 there are legitimate reasons for insisting on finality. Until an owner has the
final application of a regulation to his property, it is impossible
to tell whether the land retains any reasonable beneficial use. 20'
The requirement may help clarify whether the government intends to appropriate. 2011 The intimidation of zoning and planning
personnel by the prospect of taking awards,206 and the financial
burden on cities of paying for regulatory acts 207 are frequently
cited as reasons for requiring finality in a land use context.208
Government may not always be aware that a regulation takes
property; forcing an owner to exhaust administrative remedies
allows government to foresee a taking and to plan for it
financially.209
201. 106 S. Ct. 2561 (1986).
202. MacDonald, 106 S. Ct. at 2566; Williamson, 105 S. Ct. at 3117.
203. Mandelker, Land Use Takings: The Compensation Issue, 8 HAST. L.Q. 491, 513
n.72 (1981).
204. Williamson, 105 S. Ct. at 3121.
205. See Hernandez v. City of Lafayette, 643 F.2d 1188, 1200 n.27 (5th Cir. 1981).
The Hernandez court felt that the government should be given a chance to review any
legislation whose application to particular land constituted a prima facie taking. Other
authorities agree. See Hagman, Temporary or Interim Damages Awards in Land Use
Control Cases, Part 1, 4 ZONING AND PLAN. L. REPT. 129, 134·35 (1981).
206. It seems a usurpation of legislative power for a court to force compensation.
Agins v. Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 276, 598 P.2d 25, 30, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372, 377 (1979). See
Johnson, supra note 130; Johnson feels that, due to the huge amount of zoned land,
requiring compensation for all zoning losses would remove land use regulation from the
scope of the police power. She notes courts are traditionally reluctant to act as super
zoning commissions. Contrast Berger and Kanner, supra note 26, at 751, who reject the
idea that government officials will be "sandbagged", and who note that land use deci·
sions "are the product of study and public hearings." See also Comment, supra note 83,
at 726·32; the author feels that fears of fiscal disaster may indicate that planners know
they are exceeding constitutional limits. Id. at 727. See also San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v.
City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 661 n.26 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting): "After all, if a
policeman must know the Constitution, then why not a planner?"
207. See Michelman, supra note 101. He feels a stringent compensation requirement
will raise social costs and force abandonment of important projects. Id. at 1222. See also
Comment, supra note 83, at 726·28. The Supreme Court rejected the fiscal disaster sce·
nario in Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 656 (1980). See also Hagman,
supra note 205. Hagman also rejects the fiscal argument. He feels that if requiring com·
pensation would impose staggering losses on cities, it is only because developers are al·
ready bearing staggering losses. Id. at 133.
208. Comment, supra note 83, at 726·32.
209. Id. at 731; Hernandez v. City of Lafayette, 643 F.2d 1188, 1200 (5th Cir. 1981);
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Insisting on exhaustion also reduces the burden on the
courts,210 provides for the resolution of issues by agencies which
are familiar with local conditions 21l and prevents the courts from
interfering unnecessarily in local land use decisions.212 The finality requirement avoids the constitutional resolution of issues
which can be otherwise disposed of.213 The failure to obtain a
final determination of permitted use may amount to a facial attack on an ordinance. Courts are reluctant to deal with the facial
constitutionality of a regulation,214 since such adjudication often
involves separation of powers problems. Requiring that administrative remedies be exhausted prevents such facial attacks.
Unfortunately, it is hard to know when a land use decision
is final. Regulations are seldom "final", since variances, rezonings and conditional uses are often available.2lIi Rejected development plans can be revised and resubmitted.216 Since local
government often reacts inconsistently, initial action on development proposals seldom reliably predicts future responses.217 The
result is a developer under siege. 218 The exhaustion requirement
"leaves the landowner vulnerable to a bewildering series of multiple-agency restrictions, buck-passing and dilatory vacillation".219 Prince George's County v. Blumberg220 is a classic exHagman, supra note 205, at 134.
210. Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 522 (1977); Prince George's County v.
Blumberg, 288 Md. 275, 284, 418 A.2d 1155, 1160-61 (1980).
211. Moore, 431 U.S. at 524; Prince George's, 288 Md. at 284, 418 A.2d at 1160.
212. Moore, 431 U.S. at 525; Prince George's, 288 Md. at 284, 418 A.2d at 1160-61.
See generally supra note 206.
213. Moore, 431 U.S. at 525, 526.
214. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980).
215. Hagman, supra note 205, at 134; Comment, supra note 83, at 733. See MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 106 S. Ct. 2561, 2571 (1986) (regulatory
decisions are an ongoing process).
216. See Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 137 (1978).
217. See Williamson Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 105 S. Ct. 3108, 3117-18
(1985). Although the developer's project was unable to meet ordinance requirements in
at least eight areas, no matter what plan was submitted, the Court felt the owner should
have sought variances which would have resolved at least five of the objections. Unresolved, of course, was whether any plan would be approved if the remaining three objections were not removed.
218. Berger and Kanner, supra note 26, at 697. The authors compare a developer to
a wagon train headed West at which desperados and Indians take potshots with
impunity.
219. Comment, supra note 83, at 733; see also MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v.
County of Yolo, 106 S. Ct. 2561 (1986) (property owner was entangled in a multi-agency
web woven by the City of Davis and Yolo County), and Prince George's County v.
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ample. Days before the plaintiff began construction on a high
rise, he learned that the County intended to revoke his building
permit. A law passed after its issuance required that he have a
contractor's license. 221 Plaintiff applied for a license but began
construction while its issuance was pending since he had to have
footings in within six months in order to maintain his sewer permit. 222 Because he had no license, the County issued a stop notice. It also advised the sewer district that the building permit
had been revoked. Predictably, the sewer district withdrew the
sewer permit. The County then advised the owner it would not
reissue a building permit until the sewer permit was reinstated. 223 The County Board of Appeals had jurisdiction over the
building permit,224 but none over the sewer permit. The owner
charged that his administrative remedies were inadequate, and
sued for injunctive relief.m The court denied relief,226 and held
that he was required to separately exhaust the remedies of each
agency.227
There are some exceptions to the exhaustion requirement.
Exhaustion of legislative remedies is not required. 228 An owner
need not exhaust his remedies if a governmental body lacks authority to grant relief, if relief would be inadequate, if the administrative body has demonstrated hostility and the owner's
petition would be futile or if irreparable harm would occur during the delay.229 Requiring a landowner to run the gauntlet of
repeated applications and denials in order to pinpoint local government's definitive position is not always necessary.230 GovernBlumberg, 288 Md. 275, 418 A.2d 1155 (1980).
220. 288 Md. 275, 418 A.2d 1155 (1980) ..
221. [d. at 279, 418 A.2d at 1158.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.

[d.
[d.
[d. at 289, 418 A.2d at 1163.
Id. at 281-82, 418 A.2d at 1159.
Id. at 292-94, 418 A.2d at 1165.

Id.
228. Kmiec, Regulatory Takings: The Supreme Court Runs Out of Gas in San Diego, 57 IND. L.J. 45, 57 (1982); see also Euclid v. Ambler, 272 U.S. 365, 386 (1926).
229. See Kmiec, supra note 228, at 58; see generally Comment, Exhausting Administrative and Legislative Remedies in Zoning Cases, 48 TULANE L. REV. 665, 667-73
(1974), and City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson, 27 Cal. 3d 123, 137, 610 P.2d 436, 444,
164 Cal. Rptr. 539, 547 (1980).
230. MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 106 S. Ct. 2561, 2571 (1986).
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ment's position can be determined by analyzing factors other
than its actual decision on a given application.231
There should also be an exception to the exhaustion requirement when unfair state procedural rules regarding exhaustion violate the Supremacy Clause. 232 State courts decide, based
on state procedural rules, whether an owner has exhausted his
administrative remedies. Because a federal taking claim cannot
arise unless such remedies have been exhausted,233 state courts
are frequently the arbiters of whether the taking issue is "ripe"
or justiciable. However, whether a federal question exists is a
matter to be determined by federal, not state, courts,234 since
preclusion of federal review on state procedural grounds jeopardizes important federal rights. 23Ii A state's determination that
administrative procedures have not been exhausted should not
preclude review of the taking issue, a federal question, unless
the federal courts find state procedural rules fair.236
Although a landowner's taking claim is not premature if it is
clear that the local government will not revoke an unconstitutional regulation,237 it is dangerous for a landowner to unilaterally decide that seeking relief would be futile. The courts may
well determine, in the exercise of judicial hindsight, that it is not
at all clear that such a petition would have been futile.236 This
231. [d.
232. Article VI of the United States Constitution provides: "This Constitution ...
shall be the supreme Law of the Land ... any Thing ... in the Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding."
233. Exhaustion of administrative remedies is an essential legal element of a taking
claim. MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 106 S. Ct. 2561, 2566 (1986);
Williamson Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 105 S. Ct. 3108, 3117 (1985).
234. L. TRIBE, supra note 162, §3-33, at 123 (1978).
235. [d.
236. The Supreme Court is generally zealous in scrutinizing state court procedures
for fairness. See McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284 (1984); Kremer v.
Chemical Construction Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 481 (1982); Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90
(1980).
237. City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson, 27 Cal. 3d 123, 137, 610 P.2d 436, 444, 164
Cal. Rptr. 539, 547 (1980). See also Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977). In
Moore, the plaintiff attacked an ordinance which permitted only immediate blood relatives to occupy a residential dwelling, and which prohibited her grandsons from living
with her. The Court held Cleveland's variance procedure irrelevant since the ordinance
was facially unconstitutional on due process grounds (abridging the right of related family members was outside the scope of a legitimate exercise of the police power) and because there was no basis for inferring that the plaintiff would have gotten the variance.
[d. at 511-12.
238. See MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 106 S. Ct. 2561 (1986);
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risk can be eliminated without forcing the owner to jump
through endless regulatory hoops. A solution was suggested in
Hernandez v. Lafayette. 239
In Hernandez, the City of Lafayette refused to rezone the
plaintiffs property from single family to multiple density or office. The plaintiff charged that the City refused in order to depress land values pending an eminent domain proceeding
designed to take part of the land for a road. 240 The Fifth Circuit
Court held that a regulatory taking did not occur until the municipality's governing body was given a "realistic opportunity
and reasonable time within which to review its zoning legislation
vis-a-vis the particular property and to correct the inequity".241
In a footnote, the court alluded to a procedure that could be
utilized to give the city that opportunity-an owner's petition
for rezoning. 242 The idea has been endorsed by legal scholars.243
Regulated by state statutes, it would resolve the question of
whether seeking further administrative remedies would be futile.
Government's non-response to the petition could be deemed a
final administrative decision and an expression of intent to
take.244
The petition procedure would also resolve some of the separation of power and fiscal objections to the concept of regulatory
takings. In Ventures in Property Investm~nt Company v. City
of Wichita,2411 a property owner obtained tentative approval of a
plat map. Permanent approval was withheld until the City of
Wichita decided on the location of a highway corridor. After
waiting for the determination for four years, the plaintiff sued. 246
see also Zoning, AMERICAN LAWYER, 112 (1986), a comment on the MacDonald case,
describing 110ward Ellman's assert.ion, in oral argument before the Supreme Court, that
application for review of a less intensive subdivision plan would have been "futile". The
assertion was rejected by a majority of the Court, and turned out to be the fatal weakness in the case. See also Prince George's County v. Blumberg, 288 Md. 275, 418 A.2d
1155 (1980).
239. 643 F.2d 1188 (5th Cir. 1981).
240. Id. at 1191.
241. Id. at 1200.
242. Id. at 1200 n.27.
243. Hagman, supra note 205, at 134-35. Hagman feels that even a formal letter
should be sufficient. Id. at 134. See also Kmiec, supra note 228, at 61-63.
244. Hagman, supra note 205, at 134.
245. 225 Kan. 698, 594 P.2d 671 (1979).
246. Id. at 699-701, 594 P.2d at 675.
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The trial court found that the City had effected a taking. 247 The
higher court reversed and ordered the City to approve the plaintiff's final map or condemn his property within six months. Failing either, judgment would be entered against the City, which
would be liable for damages.248 This amount of direct involvement by the courts in legislative affairs makes them "superzoning commissions",249 involved in both land use and appropriations decisions. The petition procedure would reduce the courts'
impact on both. Government, on receipt of the petition, is given
notice that it has taken. Unless it chooses to contest, it can then
rescind, modify or compensate. The courts are not involved. The
matter remains in the administrative arena. 250
The objection that local governments often "take" unwittingly would be irrelevant. For example, the owner in Hernandez could have delivered a petition to the Lafayette City
Council, advising it that he considered the Council's refusal to
rezone a regulatory taking. Lack of response within a statutorily
defined period would have been deemed, at law, to constitute a
final administrative decision. The owner would not be required
to exhaust further administrative remedies before seeking judicial review.
The petition procedure presents some problems. The landowner, rather than the courts, becomes the initial arbiter of a
taking. If he decides his land has been taken and petitions for a
rezoning, he may intimidate local government into administrative relief to which he is not entitled. The extent to which the
petition procedure intimidates decisionmaking will depend on
local government's willingness to "stonewall it", and force the
owner into the courts. Overall, the petition will help determine
whether there has been a per se exhaustion of remedies and will
also eliminate one of the greatest escape hatches through which
the federal courts retreat to avoid finding a taking. 251
247. [d.
248. [d. at 714, 594 P.2d at 683.
249. Johnson, supra note 130, at 601. Johnson notes that federal courts, at least, are
traditionally reluctant to act as super-zoning commissions.
250. Hagman, supra note 205, at 134. Hagman feels that formal suit should not be
necessary.
251. See generally supra, note 171. The other major escape hatch appears to be
abstention. See Berger and Kanner, supra note 26, at 694-95.
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INSUFFICIENT

REMEDY
Bare invalidation of an oppressive regulation is not a sufficient remedy.2t12 Invalidation prevents future loss of use, but it
does not compensate a landowner for losses sustained during the
lifetime of the regulation. 2113 Because it is almost impossible to
invalidate a course of conduct,2t14 it places him on a regulatory
merry-go-round,2t1t1 and encourages planners to throw the burdens of progress on a few individuals: 2t16 invalidation of a regulation is "inexpensive" compared to the just compensation required in eminent domain. Such uneven distribution of
regulatory burdens is contrary to the spirit of the Fifth Amend- .
ment, which restrains government from forcing individuals to
bear burdens which should be borne by the public. 2t17 Invalidation is a due process remedy. Since a regulation can effect a taking without violating due process standards, injunctive relief
may not always be available.
Prior to Pennsylvania Coal,2t18 invalidation was the only
remedy available for excessive regulation. Some state courts continue to apply it exclusively in land use cases. 2tlD A few legal
scholars maintain that invalidation should be the exclusive remedy on a public policy basis: they argue that the importance of
the public interest in land use cases justifies "asymmetrical
252. See generally Berger and Kanner, supra note 26, at 731-38, and Corrigan v.
City of Scottsdale, No. 18239-PR, slip op. at 11, 12 (Ariz., June 2, 1986): "Without a
damages remedy, invalidation alone is a toothless tiger."
253. Hagman, supra note 205, at 130; Berger and Kanner, supra note 26, at 732.
254. Berger and Kanner, supra note 26, at 737.
255. Comment, supra note 83, at 733. See also Justice Brennan's footnote in San
Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 655 n.22 (1980), reciting the
jaded comments of a city attorney, and Berger and Kanner, supra note 26, at 734:
"[T)he supposedly victorious owner, who has succeeded in having a court invalidate an
unconstitutional regulation, finds that his reward is an invitation to become a yo-yo."
256. Burrows v. City of Keene, 121 N.H. 590, 599, 432 A.2d 15, 20 (1981).
257. San Diego Gas, 450 U.S. at 656 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also Sax, supra
note 74, at 55-58, which discusses the purpose of the fifth amendment as being protection of the individual from arbitrary and tyrannical acts of government. Under this view
of the fifth, the amendment was intended as a bulwark against governmental unfairness,
not against diminution of value. Accord L. TRIBE, supra note 162, §9-4, at 463 (1978).
258. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
259. Agins v. Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 272-73, 598 P.2d 25, 28, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372,
375 (1979); Fred F. French Inv. Co. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y. 2d 587, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5,
350 N.E.2d 381, 386-87 (1976).
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remedies".26o Others insist that invalidation relieves any financial detriment to the owner.261
The judicial trend at the federal and state level is to acknowledge that invalidation alone is not an adequate remedy.262
There is recognition of the fact that invalidation does not compensate the owner for his full economic 10ss.263 At the federal
level, dissents in two major cases appear to agree that states
cannot limit a landowner's remedies to injunctive or declaratory
relief. 264 They insist that rescission of a regulation does not remove the taking. 2611 Justice Brennan stated in San Diego Gas &
Electric Company v. City of San Diego that the Just Compensation Clause is not "precatory" and the Fifth Amendment provision regarding just compensation "self-executing".266 Justice
260. Mandelker, supra note 203, at 498. Mandelker argues that the normal remedial
hierarchy should be skewed in land use cases: the normal preference for damages which
awards injunctive relief only if damages are inadequate is not operative in such cases. Id.
at 491-92. He feels this asymmetry is due to the importance of the public interest at
stake, and refers to the airplane overflight cases as examples of the courts' tolerance of
asymmetry in regulation cases: the overflight cases award only legal, not equitable, relief.
[d. at 497, 504.
261. Johnson, supra note 130, at 595. Johnson argues that after invalidation, the
economic impact of the regulation is typically small in relation to the total value of the
land, and that the magnitude of the loss is therefore not sufficient to constitute a taking.
Id. at 595. She also argues that it is unfair to compensate a landowner burdened by an
unconstitutional regulation but not to compensate one who is burdened by a constitutional one, as in the case of development moratoriums imposed while regulations are
adopted. Id. at 595. For a good response to her insistence that invalidation removes most
of the economic harm, see Comment, supra note 83, at 740-45, and especially the author's analysis of Prince George's County v. Blumberg, 228 Md. 275, 418 A.2d 1155
(1980).
262. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 653 (1981),
(Brennan, J., dissenting). See Williamson Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 105 S.
Ct. 3108, 3124-25 (1985), (Brennan, J., concurring); Burrows v. City of Keene, 121 N.H.
590, 599-600, 432 A.2d 15, 20 (1981); Hernandez v. City of Lafayette, 643 F.2d 1188, 1200
(5th Cir. 1980).
263. Williamson, 105 S. Ct. at 3124-25; San Diego Gas, 450 U.S. at 655 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
264. MacDonald, Sommer &. Frates v. County of Yolo, 106 S. Ct. 2561, 2574 (1986)
(White, J., dissenting); San Diego Gas, 450 U.S. at 653-57, (Brennan, J., dissenting}/But
see the majority opinion in Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980), which declined
to consider whether a state could limit the remedies available to a person whose land had
been taken without just compensation. Id. at 263.
265. MacDonald, 106 S. Ct. at 2574 (White, J., dissenting); San Diego Gas, 450 U.S.
at 657, (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan argues that "Nothing in the Just Compensation Clause suggests that 'takings' must be permanent and irrevocable. Nor does
the temporary reversible quality of a regulatory 'taking' render compensation for the
time of the 'taking' any less obligatory." Id. at 657.
266. San Diego Gas, 450 U.S. at 654, (Brennan, J. dissenting). See also 6 NICHOLS,
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White declared in MacDonald, Sommer & Frates u. County of
Yolo267 that rescission of a regulation does not reverse a taking,
and that the Constitution requires that just compensation be
paid for a temporary taking.266 Furthermore, if the police power
and the power of eminent domain are coterminus,269 a regulation
which promotes a legitimate police power objective is entitled to
the same judicial deference as an exercise of eminent domain. 270
The scope of review of public purpose is "extremely narrow".271
It seems anomalous to allow a legislature to insist on deference
in order to sustain a regulation and yet allow it to suddenly
claim the regulation should be invalidated if the courts find a
taking. 272 The Supreme Court barred such self-serving gamesmanship in eminent domain cases, holding in Ruckelshaus u.
Monsanto Company273 that "[e]quitable relief is not available to
enjoin an alleged taking of private property for public use, duly
authorized by law, where a suit for compensation can be brought
against the sovereign subsequent to the taking."274 Since eminent domain and the police power are coterminus, government
should not be able to play switch and bait games with equitable
remedies in regulatory taking cases.
Whether, in a given situation, government has the right to
regulate and whether such regulation takes property are separate issues.2711 A regulation may survive due process scrutiny but
still effect a taking for which compensation is required. 276 In ELdridge u. City of Palo Alto,277 the property owner sued for a
supra note 1, §25.41, and United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 257 (1980).

267. 106 S. Ct. 2561 (1986).
268. Id. at 2574 (White, J., dissenting).
269. Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 476 U.S. 229, 240 (1984).
270. Berger and Kanner, supra note 26, at 705-06.
271. Berman v. Parker, 438 U.S. 26,32 (1954). Accord Hawaii Hous. Auth., 467 U.S.
at 240-41.
272. Berger and Kanner, supra note 26, at 706.
273. 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
274. [d. at 1016.
275. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 174 (1979). Accord Loretto v.
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 425 (1982); United States v. Security Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 74 (1982). See generally Berger and Kanner, supra note 26,
at 728-31.
276. Eldridge v. City of Palo Alto, 57 Cal. App. 3d 613, 621, 129 Cal. Rptr. 575
(1976), uacated 24 Cal. 3d 266, 273, 598 P.2d 25, 28, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372, 375 (1979). See
also Wright, Damages or Compensation for Unconstitutional Land Use Regulations, 37
ARK. L. REV. 612, 619 (1984). See generally supra note 275.
277. 57 Cal. App. 3d 613, 129 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1976), uacated 24 Cal. 3d 266, 273, 598
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taking on the basis of an open space ordinance he conceded was
valid.278 The California Court of Appeals agreed that the ordinance did not violate due process standards, but held that its
validity did not immunize it from a taking challenge. 279 Since
there is no necessary relationship between an ordinance's validity under a Fourteenth Amendment due process test and its constitutionality under a Fifth Amendment taking test, insisting on
invalidation, a due process remedy, as the only remedy for an
excessive regulation 280 is wholly without merit.
IV. CALCULATION OF JUST COMPENSATION FOR THE
REGULATORY TAKING IS POSSIBLE
Assuming the payment of compensation is not precatory but
mandatory,281 a major problem remains: calculating that compensation. 282 The principles used for calculating just compensation in eminent domain cases provide a basis for its calculation
in regulatory cases. However, the formula should reflect the temporary nature of the regulatory taking, and the fact that an
owner is not entitled to all possible uses of his property. In addition, the regulatory formula should minimize the balance of
power problems inherent in court-ordered compensation for legislative acts.

A.

THE EMINENT DOMAIN STANDARD

In eminent domain cases, the government is required to pay
the landowner the full fair market value of the interest taken. 283
In order to be "just" for purposes of the Fifth Amendment, such
P.2d 25, 28, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372, 375 (1979).
278. [d. at 617, 621, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 577, 579.
279. [d. at 632, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 586.
280. Agins v. Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 273, 598 P.2d 25, 28, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372, 375
(1979).
281. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 654 (1981) (Bren·
nan, J., dissenting). See Bauman, supra note 26, at 95 for an explanation of Justice
Brennan's '''non-precatory'' language.
282. MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 106 S. Ct. 2561, 2574 (1986);
Hagman, supra note 56, at 6.
283. 4 NICHOLS, supra note 1, §12.1. Fair market value is "the price agreed to by an
informed seller who is willing but not obligated to sell, and an informed buyer who is
willing but not obligated to buy." Uniform Eminent Domain Code §1004(a), 13 ULA 104
(1980).
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compensation should be the full and perfect equivalent in
money of the property taken. 284 An owner is to be placed in as
good a position, pecuniarily, as he would have been in had the
property not been taken. 286 The fair market standard is geared
to compensating the owner not just for the existing use, but for
its best and highest use under existing zoning. 286 If only part of
an owner's land is taken, and the partial taking reduces the
value of the remaining property, an owner is entitled to compensation for the diminished value. 287 If the value of his remaining
land is enhanced by the condemnation, the government is allowed to deduct that from his award.288
An eminent domain award is based on the value of property
alone. It does not take the individual circumstances of the owner
or the state of his business into consideration. 289 While all the
other clauses in the Fifth Amendment are personal, the Just
Compensation Clause is not: its emphasis is on property alone. 29o
As a result,special idiosyncratic value and consequential damages are usually ignored in calculating just compensation. 291
The market standard may not be used when it is too difficult to ascertain value. Another standard may be adopted if the
use of market value would be unjust to the owner or to the public. 292 Deviation from the market standard requires unusual circumstances such as a controlled market. 293
284. Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 326 (1893).
285. United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 373 (1943).
286. L. ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1936); see Costonis, supra note 23, at 1042-45, for a critique of the best and highest use standard.
287. Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548, 574 (1897); see also infra note 278.
288. Bauman, 167 U.S. 548.
289. [d. at 580.
290. Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 326 (1893).
291. United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372 (1946); United States v. General
Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373 (1945); United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369 (1943). See also
infra note 323.
292. United States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 121, 123 (1950). This
case involved a government requisition of black pepper in a controlled World War II
market. The plaintiff asked for a fair market price which the court rejected, saying that
fair market value was not always an appropriate standard, and was clearly inappropriate
in a controlled market. [d. at 122-23, 130.
293. [d. In the Commodities Trading case, the Office of Price Administration had
established a ceiling price on pepper. The plaintiff sought an uncontrolled fair market
value for its pepper, but the court held the ceiling price was the proper measure of just
compensation. [d. at 130.
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ApPLYING THE EMINENT DOMAIN STANDARD TO REGULATORY

TAKINGS

Justice Brennan agreed in San Diego Gas that eminent domain standards of just compensation were adequate in regulatory cases. 294 There are reasons to object to their use. Condemnation results in the permanent transfer of the fee; regulations
do not.29Ii Regulations seldom have any permanent effect.296 Zoning decisions may distribute use rights unevenly,297 but property
owners do not have vested rights in any given zoning. 296 Strictly
applying the eminent domain standard for just compensation
would require local government to pay for a use it created. For
example, in the MacDonald case,299 Yolo County zoned the
plaintiff's land for residential use,300 then later decided it was
appropriate only for agricultural use. SOl If the County had condemned the land instead of downzoning it, it would have had to
compensate the owner for the best and highest use of the land
under the residential zoning. The reduction of use from residential to agricultural was not, in and of itself, a taking. The owner
was not entitled to residential use, only to some beneficial use.
The taking occurred because no use was possible under the agricultural designation. An award of compensation based on the
residential zoning would have been a windfall to the owner.
Eminent domain compensation standards can be adapted to
regulatory taking cases. Such adaptations should discriminate
between permanent and temporary takings and between reduction versus deprivation of use.
294. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego. 450 U.S. 621, 658-59 (1981)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
295. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668-69 (1887). See Arverne Bay Construction
Co. v. Thatcher, 278 N.Y. 222. 232, 15 N.E.2d 587, 592 (1938), which noted that an oppressive regulation left the owner with little more than the obligation to pay taxes.
296. Golden v. Planning Bd., 30 N.Y. 2d 359, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138, 285 N.E.2d 291
(1972).
297. Coston is, supra note 23, at 1027.
298. Johnson. supra note 130, at 566.
299. MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 106 S. Ct. 2561 (1986).
300. Appellant's Brief at 4, MacDonald. Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 106 S.
Ct. 2561 (1986) (No. 84-2015).
301. Id. at 7.
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1. Permanent versus interim damages

If a regulation permanently takes property, use of the eminent domain standard is appropriate. It is also appropriate
where a court orders acquisition of land rather than invalidating
an ordinance. 302 Where government refuses to recede from a regulation,303 permanent damages are appropriate because there is
a de facto condemnation. In most taking cases, an owner asks
only for interim damages, or for interim damages and invalidation. 304 Permanent damages are seldom awarded when a regulation is rescinded. 30 I! They seem unwarranted in such cases,308 unless temporary application of the regulation permanently destroys use or value. 307

There is resistance to interim damages. 308 Such damages
might chill the legislative function 309 by increasing the occasions
on which government would be forced to pay for the right to
regulate. Protecting the public welfare would be more expensive.
302. Ventures in Property Inv. v. City of Wichita, 225 Kan. 695, 594 P.2d 671
(1979). The court ordered the City of Wichita to either approve plaintiffs development
or to condemn the property, and gave it six months to decide. [d. at 714, 594 P.2d at 683.
There are clear separation of power problems involved in such court orders, since the
court becomes in effect a zoning commission. Contrast Sheerr v. Evesham Township, 184
N.J. Super. 11, 445 A.2d 46 (1982), where the court refused to order condemnation, hold·
ing such an order should be issued only where acquisition seemed inevitable. [d. at 61·62,
445 A.2d at 73. See also Arastra Ltd. Partnership v. City of Palo Alto, 401 F.Supp. 962
(N.D. Cal. 1972), uacated 417 F. Supp. 1125 (N.D. Cal. 1976): the court ordered the City
of Palo Alto to pay for the value of the fee as of the date the open space regulation was
passed and plaintiff was ordered to convey title on receipt of payment. [d. at 983.
303. See Eldridge v. City of Palo Alto, 57 Cal. App. 3d 613, 129 Cal. Rptr. 575
(1976). Eldridge was disapproved by the California Supreme Court in Agins v. Tiburon,
24 Cal. 3d 266, 273, 598 P.2d 25, 28, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372, 375 (1979). In Eldridge the
plaintiff conceded the validity of the open space ordinance. [d. at 617, 129 Cal. Rptr. at
577.
304. Johnson, supra note 130, at 590; see City of Austin v. Teague, 570 S.W.2d 389,
390 (Tex. 1978); Agins, 24 Cal. 3d at 271·72, 598 P.2d at 27, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 374.
305. But see Peacock v. County of Sacramento, 271 Cal. App. 2d 845, 77 Cal. Rptr.
391 (1969), where the court did award permanent damages despite rescission of the
County's regulations.
306. Johnson, supra note 130 at 592.
307. Benenson v. United States, 548 F.2d 939 (Ct. Cl. 1977).
308. Hagman, supra note 205, at 130·32; Johnson, supra note 130, at 595.
309. Johnson, supra note 130, at 593·95. But see Hagman, supra note 205, at 133,
who rejects the chill argument. Johnson feels that while interim damages exert less chill
than permanent, they will still sway legislative bodies to vote in favor of developers.
Johnson at 594. See also Michelman, supra note 101, at 1222; he feels that the award of
temporary damages will force legislators to abandon worthwhile projects.
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Damages must be certain,3lO and interim damages are difficult to
prove. 311 Some argue that no damages exist in temporary takings
at all.312 No compensation is awarded, for example, when local
government places a temporary moratorium on development in
order to revise regulations or to prevent development from overwhelming public services. 313 Despite these considerations, there
are strong indications that a majority of the Supreme Court Justices would require the payment of just compensation for temporary takings. 314
There is precedent for interim damages in "pure" eminent
domain cases involving short term condemnations. Such condemnations were frequent during World War II, and several
cases dealing with valuation of temporary takings reached the
Supreme Court.315 In United States u. General Motors Corporation,316 the federal government temporarily condemned a Chicago warehouse under the War Powers Act. The plaintiff retained the reversionary rights in a long term lease which the
condemnation interrupted. 317 The Supreme Court held that the
310. Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.s. I, 20 (1948); Sheerr v. Evesham Township 184 N.J. Super. 11,54,65,445 A.2d 46, 69, 75 (1982). See City of Austin
v. Teague, 570 S.W.2d 389, 394-95 (Tex. 1978), where the owner was able to establish a
taking but not allowed to recover compensation because he didn't prove loss with reasonable certainty.
311. Johnson, supra note 130, at 595-96.
312. Johnson, supra note 130, at 595.
313. Johnson, supra note 130, at 595. Development moratoriums imposed in order
to allow a jurisdiction to adopt regulatory guidelines are usually upheld against both due
process and taking challenges. See, e.g., Golden v. Planning Bd., 30 N.Y. 2d 359, 334
N.Y.S.2d 138, 285 N.E.2d 291 (1972); contrast Construction Ind. Ass'n v. City of
Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied 424 U.S. 934 (1976).
314. Williamson Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 105 S. Ct. 3108 (1985); San
Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981). In San Diego Gas,
Justice Brennan's dissent was joined by three other Justices - Stewart, Marshall and
Powell; Justice Rehnquist, who wrote a concurring opinion, agreed in principle with Justice Brennan, but felt no final judgment had been entered in the lower court. [d. at 63334, 636. Justice Brennan reiterated his position in Williamson, and was joined by a sixth
Justice, Justice White, in the MacDonald case. See Williamson, 105 S. Ct. at 3124-25,
and MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 106 S. Ct. 2561, 2574 (1986)
(White, J., dissenting). Two-thirds of the United States Supreme Court now find interim
takings compensable. The retirement of Chief Justice Burger should not affect the
Court's posture on this issue.
315. See Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1 (1949); United States v.
Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372 (1946); United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S.
373 (1945).
316. 323 U.S. 373 (1945).
317. [d. at 375.
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plaintiff could recover the value of the lease for the duration of
the taking. It also allowed the recovery of limited consequential
damages because the taking interrupted the plaintiff's
tenancy.3lS
Despite a judicial trend which favors compensation for the
temporary taking, the standards for valuing such compensation
are far from clear.319 As Justice Rehnquist noted in his concurrence in MacDonald,320 "the questions surrounding what compensation, if any, is due a property owner in the context of 'interim' takings are multifaceted and difficult".321 Justice Brennan
declared in San Diego Gas that the reversible quality of a temporary taking makes just compensation no less obligatory.322
State and lower federal courts have awarded interim damages
before 323 and after 324 the San Diego Gas decision. However,
there is no consensus on valuation criteria.

2. Rejection of consequential damages
The focus in eminent domain is not on making the owner
whole, but on compensating him for his property 10ss.3211 It is not
a tort to govern,326 but some legal scholars feel that there is
enough difference between eminent domain and regulation to
justify including some consequential damages in the compensation formula for regulatory takings.327
318. [d. at 378, 383.
319. MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 106 S. Ct. 2561, 2574 (1986),
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Hagman, supra note 56, at 6.
320. MacDonald 106 S. Ct. 2561 (1986).
321. [d. at 2574.
322. San Diego Gas. & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 657 (1981),
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
323. See, e.g., Sixth Camden Corp. v. Evesham Township, 420 F. Supp. 709, 728-29
(D. N.J. 1976). The court, reviewing the granting of a motion to dismiss, only "discussed"
the appropriateness of temporary damages in regulatory cases, based on the cases cited
supra note 315.
324. Zinn v. State, 112 Wis. 2d 417, 334 N.W.2d 67 (1983); Sheerr v. Evesham
Township, 184 N.J. Super. 11, 445 A.2d 46 (1982).
325. Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. I, 5 (1949); United States v.
General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945); United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369,
373 (1943); Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 326 (1893).
326. Hagman, supra note 205, at 133.
327. Wright, supra note 276, at 639; General Motors, 323 U.S. at 383.
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Divergent attitudes toward the purpose of compensation
produce a lack of consensus regarding recovery of non-property
losses. Justice Brennan argued in San Diego Gas that compensation should redistribute the economic cost of regulation from the
individual to the public at large. 328 Redistributive compensation
would cover economic loss beyond mere property value. 329 The
principal objection to this approach is that it redistributes only
losses, not gains. Although an owner can be selectively favored
by regulations, his gains are not redistributed. He is not required to pay the government back for his special advantages.
Some feel that since an owner doesn't have to pay for regulatory
advantages, government shouldn't have to pay him when he is
disadvantaged. 330
Others urge that compensation should be paid only if
government is acting in an enterprise capacity, but not when it
acts as an arbitrator, resolving conflicts between uses. 331 Spur
Industries, Inc. v. Del E. Webb Development Company332 is a
classic "arbitral" case. In Del Webb, residential development encroached on a pre-existing stockyard. When residents complained about odors and health hazards, the City closed the
stockyard, but forced the developer to compensate the stockyard
328. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 656 (1981),
(Brennann, J., dissenting). The "redistribution of regulatory burden" theme is echoed in
a number of cases. See, e.g., PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 82·83
(1980); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922).
329. See Justice Brennan's comments in San Diego Gas, 450 U.S. at 657: "The payment of just compensation serves to place the landowner in the same position monetarily
as he would have occupied if his property had not been taken." Justice Brennan contemplates damages beyond mere property value, since he cites United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373 (1945). San Diego Gas at 659. General Motors involved the
government's condemnation of a long term lease. The Court noted that while market
value was ordinarily the proper measure of compensation, it was sometimes an inappro·
priate measure. [d. at 379-80. It distinguished between the taking of a permanent fee and
the taking of a temporary right to occupy and awarded consequential damages, arguing
that bare market value would be "confiscation", not "compensation". [d. at 380-81.
330. Johnson, supra note 130, at 595.
331. Sax, supra note 74, at 62·75. See also Fred F. French Inv. Co. v. City of New
York, 39 N.Y. 2d 587, 593, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5, 8, 350 N.E.2d 381, 384 (1976), where the court
applied Sax' arbitral/enterprise distinction. Although Sax coined the phrase, the distinction grows out of the treatment of the police power -in nuisance cases. Abatement of a
nuisance - an "arbitral" act· is not a compensable taking. See Hadacheck v. Sebastian,
239 U.S. 394 (1915).
332. 108 Ariz. 178,494 P.2d 700 (1972).
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owner. In Eldridge v. City of Palo Alto,333 the City of Palo Alto
acted as a market participant, acquiring open space by regulation. The arbitral/enterprise distinction is based on writings
completed before and during the drafting of the Fifth Amendment. SS4 These writings emphasize the need to protect landowners against unfairness, not against value diminution. 336 However,
since arbitral/enterprise theorists see property as economic value
defined by the process of competition,336 "activity" value as well
as "land" value is compensable.
A third approach, the "fairness" approach, emphasizes
"equalization" of the burdens of regulation. 337 Under the redistributive view, the individual's full regulatory losses are shifted
back onto society.ss8 Those who utilize a fairness analysis would
shift only the excess increment of loss onto society.339 As such,
something less than an owner's full property or special losses
might be due.
The choice of compensation goals - redistribution, protection or fairness - affects whether non-property losses are compensable in taking cases. Considerations of fairness to society
may also affect the availability of consequentials. In an eminent
333. 57 Cal. App. 3d 613, 129 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1976).
334. Sax, supra note 74, at 57-58.
335. [d. at 53.
336. [d. at 61. Sax, apparently frustrated with the problems of defining "government
enterprise" and trying to develop a basis for property value that ignored events outside
the property's boundaries, later abandoned the arbitral/enterprise theory for an ecological view of property which admitted that property values and use were part of a social
ecosystem. Since most uses had impacts beyond property boundaries, only those use impacts limited to the confines of given property were compensable if "taken" by regulation. It appears that Sax found most government regulation to be arbitral. See Sax,
supra note 101, at 155-62.
337. See Michelman, supra note 101, and Costonis, supra note 23. Both Michelman
and Costonis are concerned about capricious redistribution of wealth by government
acts, but both reject full compensation (i.e., the market value standard). Coston is feels
that compensation should reimburse an owner only for taking reasonable beneficial use,
not best and highest use. Coston is at 1022-23. Michelman feels compensation should be
paid only if settlement costs are greater than the efficiency gains and demoralization
costs of the regulation, and would protect individual owners only from "concentrated"
losses. Michelman at 1213, 1222.
338. See, e.g., Ciamporcero, 'Fair' is Fair: Valuing the Regulatory Taking, 15 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 741, 754 (1982). See Blume and Rubinfeld, Compensation for Takings: An
Economic Analysis, 72 CAL. L.REV. 569, 615 (1984), for a discussion of zoning by Special
Assessment Financed Eminent Domain Statutes in Minnesota.
339. Ciamporcero, supra note 338, at 756; Coston is, supra note 23, at 1050-52.
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domain context, just compensation means compensation that is
just to the public as well as the individual. 340 This may mean
balancing public and private interests in arriving at just compensation. In a regulatory context, the sheer number of regulatory acts exposes the government to fiscal disaster.34} The payment of compensation for regulatory acts may also inhibit local
officials and present separation of power problems. In order to
be just to the public, compensation for regulatory takings should
be fair but should not be a windfall. As a result, most courts
have adopted the eminent domain standard, which focuses on
property value alone,342 and which does not award consequential
damages. 343 Only a few courts are willing to award damages that
are not directly tied to property in regulatory taking cases. 344
Compensation in such cases should be calculated on the basis of
the property interest taken, which is the right to beneficial use.
Market forces compensate for consequential losses. Property
value rebounds after the regulation effecting the taking is invalidated. As a result, there may be a net gain to the plaintiff
whether or not development costs were expended. In Cordeco
Development Corporation v. Santiago Vasquez,34~ the plaintiff
340. Chesapeake & Ohio Canal v. Key, 3 Cranch CC 599, 601 (1829), cited in
Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548, 570 (1897). See also United States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 121, 123 (1950).
341. Even though the fiscal disaster argument was rejected in Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980), a non-taking case, local officials remain presumably less
than enthusiastic about paying compensation in regulatory taking cases - especially in
light of the current fiscal conservatism evidenced by such measures as California's infamous "Prop. 13" (Jarvis-Gann Proposition 13 Initiative, codified at Cal. Const. art. 13A,
§§1-6). See also Johnson, supra note 130, at 563.
342. Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1 (1949). See also Hernandez
v. City of Lafayette, 643 F.2d 1188, 1200 (5th Cir. 1981). The Kimball rationale upholds
a strict property approach that reimbursement is due only for what is taken, and other
consequentials are disallowed except as they go to prove property value.
343. United States v. Petty, 327 U.S. 372, 378 (1946). Petty also rejected valuation
based on the value of property to the specific owner, holding that market value doesn't
fluctuate with the needs of the condemnor or condemnee, but only with general market
demand for property. [d. at 377.
344. See Prince George's County v. Blumberg, 288 Md. 275, 418 A.2d 1155 (1980),
which awarded the developer interest on lost profits. However, Sixth Camden Corp. v.
Evesham Township, 420 F. Supp. 709 (D.N.J. 1976), rejects the lost profits basis, holding
that future profits are not compensable. [d. at 729. Sheerr v. Evesham Township, 184
N.J. Super. 11, 445 A.2d 46 (1982), also rejected lost profits as "too uncertain to permit
proof'. ld. at 65, 445 A.2d 75. This seems in line with the fact that invalidation eliminates future losses. See Johnson, supra note 130, at 595. See also Keystone Associates v.
Moerdler, 19 N.Y. 2d 78, 278 N.Y.S.2d 185, 224 N.E.2d 700 (1966), which awarded carrying charges incurred during the period of the temporary taking.
345. 539 F.2d 256 (1st Cir. 19'76).
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tried to use lost profits to measure the compensation due. Conspiring with a wealthy landowner, government officials had used
the permit process to prevent the plaintiff from extracting and
marketing sand deposits on its land. The court refused to use
the lost profits as the measure of damages because the sand had
doubled in value. 346
Rejecting consequential damages in constitutional taking
cases is appropriate in light of the fact that tort damages are
seldom awarded in taking cases brought under the Section 1983
civil rights statute. 347 In Carey v. Piphus,348 a 1983 action, several male students were suspended without hearings for using
marijuana and wearing earrings on campus. They were allowed
to recover nominal damages without proof of loss on the theory
that the right to procedural due process is absolute. The Supreme Court held that the right to damages flowed from the violation alone, even absent proof of injury.349 However, the majority opinion noted that a tort rule of damages would not apply to
every Section 1983 case.3IiO The majority felt that compensation
should be tailored to the interest protected. 351 A lower federal
court subsequently rejected damages in a Section 1983 regulatory
taking case. It held that they were discretionary, not mandatory,
in Section 1983 taking cases, and found them inappropriate
under the particular circumstances of the case.352 In Hernandez
v. City of Lafayette,353 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals dealt
with a 1983 action by deferring to eminent domain standards
and focusing on property value. The Circuit Court held that an
action for damages would lie under 1983 in favor of any person
whose property was taken without just compensation, but that
346. [d. at 262.
347. 42 U.S.C. §1983 (1982). Section 1983 provides a damages remedy to a person
claiming deprivation of a federal constitutional right by a person or entity acting under
color of state law. Thus, an owner whose property has been taken by regulation can sue
directly under the Constitution's fifth amendment for just compensation, or under Section 1983 for damages.
348. 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
349. [d. at 266-67.
350. [d. at 258.
351. [d. at 259.
352. Jacobson v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 474 F. Supp. 901, 903 (D. Nev.
1979).
353. 643 F.2d 1188 (5th Cir. 1981).
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the proper measure of damages in such an action was an amount
equal to the value of the property for the period of the taking. 3114
3. Rejection of the best and highest use standard

In eminent domain, compensation is awarded on the basis
of the best and highest use of the land under the existing zoning. 31111 The eminent domain standard is not easily applied to regulatory takings.3116 An owner does not have a vested right to existing zoning,3117 and may not be able - or motivated - to put the
property to its best and highest use.3118 It seems unreasonable to
calculate compensation at the best and highest use of property
when that use is not available to an owner. In Usdin v. State
Department of Environmental Protection,3119 the court awarded
the plaintiff only three years of compensation even though the
offending regulation had been in effect for six years. It reduced
the compensation because the plaintiff was not ready, willing
and able to develop until halfway through the period of regulation. 360
There is nothing constitutionally compelling about the best
and highest use standard. 361 It is a judicially evolved doctrine 362
that developed in an era largely free of regulatory controls.363 In
a modern land use context where a significant portion of land
value is created by government controls,364 the best and highest
354. Id. at 1200.
355. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 654 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also 6 NICHOLS, supra note 1, §25.41, and United States v.
Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 256 (1980).
356. Costonis, supra note 23, at 1042-45; Blume and Rubinfeld, supra note 338, at
618-23.
357. Hagman, supra note 205, at 133; Johnson, supra note 130, at 566.
358. See Hagman, Temporary or Interim Damages Awards in Land Use Control
Cases, Part 2, 4 ZONING AND PLAN. L. REPT. 137, 138 (1981); see also Usdin v. State Dept.
of Environmental Protection, 173 N.J. Super 311, 414 A.2d 280 (1980), which reduced a
taking from six to three years because the developer was unable to perform for half of
the period of the alleged taking. Id. at 332, 414 A.2d at 290-91.
359. 173 N.J. Super. 311, 414 A.2d 280 (1980).
360. Id. at 332, 414 A.2d at 290-91.
361. Costonis, supra note 23, at 1042.
362. Costonis, supra note 23, at 1042. See also United States Commodities Trading
Corp., 339 U.S. 121, 123 (1950).
363. Coston is, supra note 23, at 1042.
364. Costonis, supra note 23, at 1043-44; Johnson, supra note 130, at 595. See also
Blume and Rubinfeld, supra note 338, at 618-20: they feel the availability of compensation will encourage speculation and drive fair market values up. However, the argument
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use formula gives the owner an added increment of value. 3611 The
owner has no moral entitlement to such value, since he did nothing to create it. 366 The fact that not all land is available for all
uses creates a large part of property value. 367
The alternative to calculating compensation on the basis of
best and highest use is to use a reasonable beneficial use standard. Professor John J. Costonis recommended basing regulatory just compensation on reasonable beneficial use. 368 Although
he failed to clarify what constituted reasonable beneficial use,369
the definition can be extracted. In Penn Central, the Supreme
Court focused on whether there were any remaining permitted
uses in evaluating whether a taking had occurred. 370 The majority equated permitted uses with productive uses.371 Therefore, it
appears that a remaining permitted use and a reasonable beneficial use are essentially the same thing. If no permitted uses remain, a taking has occurred and compensation should be measured by the difference between the land's value as regulated
and its value with the minimal permitted use which would remove the taking. S72

C.

ADDITIONAL INNOVATIONS

Rejecting consequential damages and the best and highest
that zoning's impact on value is significant was rejected by Kmiec, supra note 228. He
felt that zoning's impact on value was exaggerated, and that topography, available mu·
nicipal services and transporation and the present and future uses of adjacent land were
equally important. [d. at 70-71.
365. Costonis, supra note 23, at 1042-45.
366. Kmiec, supra note 228, at 71. See also Coston is, supra note 23, citing Bernard
Siegan's quote from Mason Gaffney: "When the planning commission and the zoning
board flit about sprinkling little golden showers here rather than there, they make millionaires of some and social reformers of others." [d. at 1027.
367. For an alternate point of view, see supra note 364.
368. Costonis, supra note 23, at 1049-55.
369. Costonis, supra note 23, at 1052. See also Berger, The Accommodation Power
in Land Use Controversies: A Reply to Professor Costonis, 76 COLUMB. L. REV. 799
(1976). Coston is discusses five use categories falling between highest and best use and
zero intensity use. A regulation which restricts use below reasonable beneficial use would
be a taking and compensable, as measured by the difference of the land value measured
at reasonable beneficial use and the permitted use which effects the taking. Coston is,
supra note 23, at 1060.
370. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 136, 137 (1978).
371. [d. at 136.
372. Ciamporcero, supra note 338, at 756; Coston is, supra note 23, at 1051-52.
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use standard partially resolves the calculation of just compensation in a regulatory context. Three issues remain: calculation of
the duration of the taking, determination of the rate of
payment, and development of a procedure for determining the
level of use which will remove the taking. Alternatives to cash
compensation should be explored in order to minimize the financial impact on local government.
1.

The duration of the regulatory taking

Justice Brennan made it clear that just compensation for a
regulatory taking should be calculated "for the period commencing on the date the regulation first effected the 'taking', and
ending on the date the government entity chooses to rescind or
otherwise amend the regulation".373 Modifications to Justice
Brennan's standard have been suggested,s7. but it has already
been adapted in state cases awarding interim damages. 37CI
2. Determination of the rate of compensation

Compensation can be based on rental rates,376 or the fair
373. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 653 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
374. See Hernandez v. City of Lafayette, 643 F.2d 1188 (5th Cir. 1981). Hernandez
suggests that the taking does not occur until "the municipality's governing body is given
a realistic opportunity and reasonable time within which to review its zoning legislation
vis-a-vis the particular property and to correct the inequity." Id. at 1100. The Hernandez court ruled that fluctuations in value during such review proceedings were not
compensable absent extraordinary delays, since they were incidents of ownership. Id. at
1201. This appears reasonable in view of consistent court holdings that moratoriums imposed to allow regulations to be adopted do not effect compensable takings. See supra
note 313. The Hernandez view was endorsed by Donald G. Hagman in Temporary or
Interim Damages Awards in Land Use Control Cases, supra note 205. Hagman seems to
suggest the taking would be deemed to occur after notification to the government plus a
not unreasonable time. Id. at 135. In Part 2 of his article, Hagman suggests application
of the so-called severance rule, under which compensation would be based on the value
immediately before and immediately after the taking in order to give the market time to
react. See supra note 358. Hagman also suggests the taking should be reduced by the
period of the developer's inability to perform, based on Usdin v. State Dept. of Environmental Protection, 173 N.J. Super. 311, 414 A.2d 280 (1980), which reduced the length of
an interim taking from six to three years. Id. at 332, 414 A.2d at 290-91.
375. See supra note 324.
376. United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373 (1945); Sixth Camden
Corp. v. Evesham Township, 420 F. Supp. 709 (D. N.J. 1976); Kimball Laundry Co. v.
United States, 338 U.S. 1 (1949). See also Hagman, supra note 358, at 138-40. See Usdin,
173 N.J. Super. 311, 318-19, 414 A.2d 280, 284 for an example of 8 generous rental
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market value of an easement377 or option. 378 The rental, easement or option value should be based not on the land's value
under the oppressive regulation, but on its value with the reasonable beneficial use which would remove the taking. Because
most land involved in regulatory takings is undeveloped, the option selected would probably not greatly affect the total compensation paid. 879 The landowner will bear the burden of proof regarding the amount of compensation due. This burden will be an
obstacle to recovery. In City of Austin v. Teague,380 for example,
the court used a rental basis for calculation of just compensation. It held that the rule of certainty applied to rental losses
and found that anticipated rentals from undeveloped land were
inherently uncertain. 381 Since the plaintiff's land had never been
rented, there was no track record. Furthermore, the plaintiff had
no specific development plans, which would have helped establish value. Therefore, even though the plaintiff established its
right to compensation, none was awarded. 382 The plaintiff simply
failed to prove that the land would have produced any return. 383
3. Determination of the level of use

The process of determining the reasonable beneficial use
might involve a separation of powers problem. Some courts have
mandated a specific use,384 which places the court in the position
formula. Hagman feels that the rental compensation ordered in Usdin ($42,301.96 for
three and one· half years) would probably chill, but adds "Perhaps the state should have
been chilled." Hagman, supra note 358, at 139.
377. Arastra Ltd. Partnership v. City of Palo Alto, 401 F. Supp. 962 (N.D. Cal.
1975), vacated 417 F. Supp. 1125 (N.D. Cal. 1976). See also San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v.
City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 657 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan
seems to characterize the interest taken as an easement.
378. Lomarch Corp. v. Mayor of Englewood, 51 N.J. 108, 113-14,237 A.2d 881, 884
(1968).
379. Hagman, supra note 358, at 140.
380. 570 S.W.2d 389 (Tex. 1978).
381. Id. at 395.
382. Id. at 394.
383. Id. at 395.
384. See Cosmopolitan Bank v. Village of Niles, Circuit Court of Cook County, (80
L 17355, Jar.. 30, 1984), cited in Smith, Inverse Condemnation as a Remedy: Its Limitations and Alternatives, 107, 125 A.L.I.-A.B.A. COURSE OF STUDY, (The Compensation Issue, Theories of Liability for Damages from Planning and Land Use Controls) (1984). In
the Niles case, the Circuit Court invalidated the Zoning Board of Appeals and Planning
Commission's denial of a use permit for a McDonald's restaurant and specifically permitted the use. See also Pa. Stat. Ann. Title 53, §11011(2) (Purdon's Supp., 1980) which
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of a superior zoning or planning commission. In one case, a district court directed the jury to determine the level at which the
property would probably have been allowed to develop and to
base compensation on that determination. 3811 This substitutes
the jury's opinion for that of locally elected representatives.
Other courts have invalidated a regulation but remanded to the
legislature for adoption of new regulations. 386
Justice Brennan approved the concept in San Diego Gas. 387
Court involvement might be avoided completely by combining
legislative remand with the Hernandez-Hagman notice idea. If a
city were given, for example, six months to remove the taking, it
could issue a Certificate of Alternate Use within that period.
The Certificate would indicate which use or uses local government would permit in order to relieve the claimed taking. 388 If
an owner were satisfied with the response, litigation could be
avoided. If an owner has already sued, the court would retain
jurisdiction and monitor government's responses. The parties
could also consent to non-binding arbitration.
Once the owner or the court accepts government's response
as removing the taking, damages can be calculated from the date
the regulation was adopted to the date it was rescinded. Value
would be based on the negotiated or adjudicated use rights in
the land. Once time frame and use level issues are resolved, ordinary eminent domain compensation principles can be used to
calculate the owner's damages. 389
allows a court to order site specific relief when an owner demonstrates that zoning restrictions are invalid as applied to his property. This allows site specific relief only, not
rezoning, per Ellick v. Board of Supervisors of Worcester Township, 17 Pa. Commw. 404,
333 A.2d 239 (1975).
385. Arastra Ltd. Partnership v. City of Palo Alto, 401 F. Supp. 962, 982 (N.D. Cal.
1975), vacated 417 F. Supp. 1125 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
386. Smith, supra note 384, at 121. See also Hernandez v. City of Lafayette, 643
F.2d 1188, 1200 (5th Cir. 1981), which approved such remand.
387. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 660-61 (1981)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
388. Hagman, supra note 205, at 135.
389. San Diego Gas, 450 U.S. at 658-59 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan
does raise the specter that some consequentials may be recoverable. Discussing cancellation of eminent domain proceedings as precedent for the temporary regulatory taking
where invalidation occurs, he argues that in both cases, the "cancellation" merely
changes the property interest taken from full ownership to temporary use and occupation. He then adds "In such cases, compensation would be measured by the principles
normally governing the taking of a right to use property temporarily." [d. at 658. Those
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Basing compensation on land use before the regulation may
be an alternative to using negotiated use levels. Justice Brennan
hinted at this possibility in San Diego Gas. 390 Such an approach
might result in unfairness. In Just u. Marinette County,391 for
example, land was in a natural, undeveloped state before being
regulated,392 so the court found that no existing use was taken. 39s
The fact that an owner has not used land in the past should not
estop his future use.
On remand, the states should be free to experiment with
compensation procedures. 394 The Constitution sets forth only
the general principle of just compensation. 3911 In eminent domain, the means of ascertaining that compensation are left to
the public authorities. 396 Florida, for example, already has a
statute, modeled on the American Land Institute Model Land
Development Code, which provides for repeal or monetary damages as alternative remedies in regulatory cases. 397 Minnesota
utilized a unique statutory rezoning procedure in the 1960's. It
authorized the establishment of residential districts if fifty percent of the property owners in the district petitioned for the
change. 398 The scheme authorized condemnation of property in
certain excluded classes when a district was rezoned, and contained provisions for the appraisal, valuation and payment of
principles were set out in cases like United States v. General Motors, 323 U.S. 373, 383
(1945), which awarded consequentials including moving and storage costs and payment
for destroyed fixtures. See also Lomarch Corp. v. Mayor of Englewood, 51 N.J. 108, 114,
237 A.2d 881, 884 (1968), which approved reimbursing plaintiff for engineering costs related to plot approval and for property taxes for the period of the taking. Arguably,
these consequential cases would not apply to many regulatory takings which involve bare
land and do not interrupt businesses.
390. San Diego Gas, 450 U.S. at 659.
391. 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972).
392. [d. at 23, 201 N.W.2d at 770·71.
393. [d.
394. San Diego Gas, 450 U.S. at 660 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting). The only restrictions Justice Brennan would place on such procedures are that they "comport with
the fundamental constitutional command", i.e., allow an owner a meaningful opportunity
to challenge a regulation that allegedly effects a taking and recover just compensation if
it does so, without being forced to resort to piecemeal litigation or unfair procedures. [d.
395. Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548, 574 (1897); San Diego Gas, 450 U.S. at 660
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
396. [d.
397. See Fla. Stat. Ann., §380.085 (West Supp., 1986).
398. Minn. Stat. Ann., §§462.11 and 462.12 (West, 1963). Section 462.11 was repealed in 1965.
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damages. 399 The existing eminent domain procedures, which empanel a separate jury to determine property value, are also workable in a regulatory context, and have, in fact, already been
used. 40o
Legislative remand gives government the opportunity to rescind and payor to maintain the regulation in force permanently or for an unspecified period. 401 Regulatory flexibility is
maximized and the government is not forced to pay for a fee
interest every time a regulation is determined to "take". On remand, government can balance the value of the regulation
against its financial cost. Separation of power problems are minimized because the decision to invalidate or compensate rests
with the legislature. 402 Not incidentally, the quality of regulation
is improved, because government is forced to look at all the impacts of regulation, not just the benefits it hopes to obtain without paying. The continuing jurisdiction of the courts preserves
the property owner's protections.

4.

The temporary taking alternative

Local government may find the temporary taking an attractive alternative to eminent domain proceedings. Since land use
patterns change, a city's goals may often be accomplished by
short-term prohibitory regulation. A city may, for example, wish
to slow growth, not stop it.403 A prospective taking of five or ten
years may allow it to accomplish such goal. The compensation
due for a regulatory taking should be less than in eminent domain since local government would pay only the easement/option/rental value of the land for the period of regulation, not for
the fee.
There are necessarily limits on prospective takings. The
399. Minn. Stat. Ann., §§462.13 and 462.14 (West Supp., 1987).
400. Arastra Ltd. Partnership v. City of Palo Alto, 401 F. Supp. 962, 982 (N.D. Cal.
1975), vacated 417 F. Supp. 1125 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
401. See Kmiec, supra note 228, at 62-63; San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San
Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 659-60 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Alternatively, the government may choose formally to condemn·the property, or otherwise to continue the offending regulation .... " ).
402. San Diego Gas, 450 U.S. at 658; Comment, supra note 83, at 725.
403. See Golden v. Planning Bd., 30 N.Y. 2d 359, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138,285 N.E.2d 291
(1972).
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court in Arverne Bay Construction Company v. Thatcher found
a regulatory taking "permanent" after nine years. 404 Indefinite,
extended takings clearly tie up capital and are probably inefficient.4OII They depress development and discourage real estate
investment. 406 They may also be unreasonable restraints on
alienation. In light of Arverne, a nine- or ten-year limit on prospective takings should be reasonable.
Compensation for the prospective taking should be paid in
annual installments. Initially, local government will determine,
on remand, via a Certificate of Alternate Use, a level of use
which would remove the taking. The value of the property at
that use would be calculated and paid annually. Since compensation is based on the use level indicated in the Certificate, local
government does not get the benefit of depressed values attributable to the regulation. 407 After a maximum of ten years, government would be forced to elect between condemnation or allowing
the land to be used at the level indicated on the Certificate.
Courts could easily fashion such an order.408
Local government could pay for prospective takings with
developer exactions. 409 Such exactions are already used to force
subdividers to pay' for the installation of roads, sewer and water
services and to extract school and park dedications. 4lO Such exactions, in the form of higher application fees, could be used to
build an insurance fund out of which local government could
pay for temporary takings. 411
404. Arverne Bay Construction Co. v. Thatcher, 278 N.Y. 222, 233, 15 N.E.2d 587,
592 (1938).
405. Michelman, supra note 101, at 1213-15.
406. Id.
407. See generally Hagman, supra note 205, at 131, for a discussion of judicial aversion to the use of regulations to lower acquisition costs.
408. See, e.g., Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y. 2d 219, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312,
257 N.E.2d 870 (1970), where the court issued a prospective injunction which would take
effect only if the defendant failed to pay permanent damages to the plaintiff for its easement to pollute.
409. R ELLICKSON & AD. TARLOCK. LAND-USE CONTROLS, 737-60 (1981). Local government often extracts user fees, cash contributions or dedications as the price of development approval. Id. at 738.
410. [d. at 738. Exactions may be statutory. Cal. Gov't Code §66477 (West Supp.,
1987) specifically authorizes local governments to exact park dedications or in lieu cash
contributions as a condition of tentative map approval.
411. Blume and Rubinfeld, supra note 338, at 571-72,582-89. The authors note that
private insurance against regulatory losses is not available. [d. at 582. The lack of insur-
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Of/sets and marketworthy alternatives

Government may be able to avoid paying compensation
completely by using more creative forms of regulation, including
offsets. Offsets, or value exchanges flowing from the government
to the property owner are critical in two ways: in eliminating the
taking and in providing non-monetary forms of just compensation. Offsets may include tax relief. In Furey v. City of Sacramento,m the City established a sewer district in an area
targeted for residential development. It placed the area in a zoning classification that precluded residential use. H3 The California Supreme Court held that the ordinance was invalid unless
the owners were relieved of their sewer assessments. 414
Benefits which reduce the regulation's impact on use can
avert a taking. Transferable development rights (TDR's) are an
example. m A city may deny development at a given site (the
granting lot) but allow a developer to transfer previously vested
development rights to another site (the receiving lot). TDR's can
be sold and therefore have at least some market value. H6 The
availability of TDR's in Fred F. French Investment Company v.
City of New York417 and Penn Central 418 were important in determining whether a taking had occurred. In Fred F. French, the
New York Supreme Court invalidated a City ordinance which
restricted development on private parklands despite a TDR program because there were no receiving lots for the TDR's.4111 In
ance results in inefficient land use and subsidizes speculators. [d. at 587-88. Government
insurance, in the form of compensation, would evenly distribute the risk of regulation,
but would also present a conflict of interest since government would be insuring against
its own acts. [d. at 571-72, 599.
412. 24 Cal. 3d 862, 598 P.2d 844, 157 Cal. Rptr. 684, app. dism. 444 U.S. 976
(1979).
413. [d. at 868, 598 P.2d at 847, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 687.
414. [d. at 877, 878, 598 P.2d at 853, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 692, 693.
415. TORs or Transferred Development Rights are a mechanism which allows a developer to transfer his development rights on a designated "granting parcel" to other
"receiving parcels" when they cannot be used on the granting parcel because of land use
restrictions. See generally Costonis, supra note 23, at 1061-70, for a discussion of TORs.
416. Fred F. French Inv. Co. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y. 2d 587, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5,
350 N.E.2d 381 (1976); Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.s. 104 (1978).
417. 39 N.Y. 2d. 587, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5, 350 N.E.2d 381 (1976).
418. Penn Central, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
419. Fred F. French, 39 N.Y. 2d at 597-98, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 11-12, 350 N.E.2d at
388.
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Penn Central, the Supreme Court found that the plaintiff had

not been denied the use of airspace above its railroad terminal
because the use rights were transferable to at least eight parcels
in the terminal's vicinity. The majority opinion stopped short of
finding that the TDR's were just compensation, but agreed that
they mitigated the owner's financial burdens.420
The economic value of TDR's can be illusory, depending on
how easily they can be transferred, market demand and the existence of legislative conditions on their use. 421 In Fred F. French,
the court found that few receiving lots were available and that
their availability was contingent on administrative approvals. 422
Because of this, the TDR program failed to preserve the economic value of the owner's development rights. 423 Local government must be careful that offsets and alternatives to cash compensation have reasonably certain value.
Other kinds of government programs can relieve a taking. In
Golden u. Planning Board of Town of Ramapo,424 the Town's
growth management plan was upheld even though it barred development for 18 years. It was sustainable because the Town reduced property taxes in proportion to the depreciation caused
by the restriction, allowed the landowner the option of accelerating development by installing municipal services himself, guaranteed development according to the Town's capital improvement timetable, and vested future development rights.421i Less
420. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 137.
421. The court in Fred F. French, 39 N.Y. 2d 587, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5, 350 N.E.2d 381,
found that TDRs granted by the City of New York did not preserve the developer's
rights to use land because the availability of receiving lots depended on happenstance
and their use was contingent on administrative approvals, adding "In such case, the development rights, disembodied abstractions of man's ingenuity, float in a limbo until
restored to reality by attachment to tangible real property." Id. at 598, 385 N.Y.S. 2d at
11, 350 N.E.2d at 388. But see Penn Central, 438 U.S. 104, where the court found the
TDRs proferred were transferable to at least eight parcels in the block surrounding the
terminal and therefore valuable. Id. at 137. The Penn Central court added that, while
the rights might not have constituted just compensation, had a taking occurred, they
nevertheless mitigated the impact of the regulation, and were "to be taken into account
in considering the impact of regulation." Id. at 137.
422. Fred F. French, 39 N.Y. 2d at 598, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 11, 350 N.E.2d at 388.
423. Id.
424. 30 N.Y. 2d 359, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138, 285 N.E.2d 291 (1972).
425. Id. at 382, 334 N.Y.S.2d 155, 285 N.E.2d 304. See Coston is, supra note 23, at
1055-60. Coston is sees Ramapo's actions as an exercise of the "accommodation power"
which maintained reasonable beneficial use. It looks more like an intelligent use of the
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complex approaches may also work. In Corrigan v. City of
Scottsdale,m city ordinances allowed an owner to increase the
residential density on his developable land' as compensation for
development restrictions on the remaining portions of his property.427 The density credits were rejected as just compensation
only because the Arizona constitution required monetary
compensation. 428
There are indications that the Supreme Court has shifted
its view of offsets and may be willing to consider them not just
in evaluating whether a taking has occurred, but in terms of
whether they represent just compensation. In MacDonald, Sommer & Frates, the Court divided the regulatory taking claim into
two components: 1. the taking - i.e., proof that a regulation has
gone too far, and 2. absence of compensation, i.e., proof that any
compensation offered by the state is not just. 429 This signals a
shift away from weighing offsets in evaluating the taking to
viewing them in terms of whether they represent just compensation. This may allow the courts to resolve taking cases more easily because focusing on the justness of compensation - i.e.,
marketworthy alternatives and other forms of conventional or
nonconventional compensation - may be easier than trying to
decide whether all use was taken.
There is no reason just compensation must be in dollars.43o
The use of marketworthy alternatives should reduce the financial impact on cities as well as protecting property owners. The
offsets must have enough tangible value: money value, not speculative value, is still the test. 431 While valuing offsets may be
police power. Towns could avert many takings if they structured their regulations more
fairly.
426. No. 18239-PR (Ariz., June 2, 1986).
427. Corrigan v. City of Scottsdale, No. 18239-PR, slip op. at 3 (Ariz., June 2, 1986).
428. [d. at 4.
429. MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 106 S. Ct. 2561, 2566 (1986).
See also Williamson Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 105 S. Ct. 3108, 3121 (1985)
(State action not complete until state fails to provide adequate postdeprivation remedy
for loss).
430. Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548, 581-84 (1897). See also Costonis, supra note 23,
at 1030-45. Coston is feels the emphasis on dollar compensation is misplaced. The Arizona State Constitution, however, requires that compensation be monetary. See Corrigan
v. City of Scottsdale, No. 18239-PR (Ariz., June 2, 1986).
431. Fred F. French Inv. Co. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y. 2d 587, 597-98, 385
N.Y.S.2d 5, 11-12, 350 N.E.2d 381. 388 (1976).
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difficult, it need not be impossible: as Professor John J. Costonis
points out, we regularly value the impact of sewer improvements
in assessing special district taxes.432 The use of alternative forms
of compensation will still result in some financial loss to local
government. They may preserve enough use to prevent a regulation from being a taking. However, as compensation, they may
not have enough tangible value to fully compensate an owner for
the interest taken,433 and some monetary compensation may still
be due. For example, courts may find that the existence of
vested future development rights in a Golden-type situation prevents a regulatory taking. Used as compensation, however, the
vested rights may not have a dollar value equal to the rental!
option/easement compensation due in a taking context.
Finally, marketworthy alternatives may be used in court orders providing equitable relief, either as the equivalent of just
compensation or as measures which would relieve the taking.434

v.

MACDONALD, SOMMER & FRATES, A CASE STUDY

MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yol o431i is a useful case study. The plaintiff's 44-acre parcel was located in the
County of Yolo, outside Davis City limits. The parcel was zoned
residential by Yolo County, but designated "Agricultural Preserve" by Davis, which embraced the land in its sphere of influence. m The County, which had included the land in a local
sewer district to which the owner had contributed over $75,000
in assessments,437 gerrymandered the sewer district borders after
the Davis action and took the property out of the district, effectively cutting the property off from service. 438 Davis refused the
owner's proposed extension of existing streets and rerouted
other mapped streets to isolate the property. It refused both
432. Costonis, supra note 23, at 1041.
433. Id.
434. Mandelker, supra note 203, at 504-05. The author feels that a legislative trend
toward fashioning more specific injunctive relief would save cities money and give
greater relief to landowners. Such orders would relieve the taking, i.e., make the regulation constitutional, so that a town would not be liable for just compensation.
435. 106 S. Ct. 2561 (1986).
436. Appellant's Brief at 5, MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 106 S.
Ct. 2561 (1986) (No. 84-2015).
437. Id. at 4.
438. Id. at 6.
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dedication of public facilities and annexation of the property.439
When the owner appl~ed for a subdivision map as a first step
toward residential development, the County denied its application on four grounds: lack of access, lack of sewer services, insufficient fire and police protection and inadequate water.440 The
Board went even further: it determined that the property could
be used only for agricultural purposes. 441 Since a foot of topsoil
had been removed and the land was infested with ineradicable
pests, the land was useless for agriculture. 442 The Yolo County
Board admitted the fact, calling the land "agriculturally impaired".443 The owner, after another unsuccessful administrative
appeal,444 sued for a taking.
The Supreme Court held that the taking claim was premature because the plaintiff had not exhausted its administrative
remedies,HII agreeing with the California Court of Appeals that
the County's refusal to permit the degree of development
desired by the landowner did not preclude less intensive
development. 446
The multi-agency involvement made the plaintiff's position
particularly uncomfortable. It was caught in a Catch 22 snare: it
was unable to satisfy the County's map requirements because
Davis would not provide city services and because the County
itself would not provide sewers.
The petition procedure, had it been available in California,
might have resolved the impasse. On denial of his appeal, the
owner could have issued a formal letter to the City and County,
claiming a taking. Its issuance would have forced Davis to
reevaluate its position and negotiate with the County, resulting
in a written determination of the level of development that both
439. [d.
440. MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 106 S. Ct. 2561, 2563, 2564
n.2 (1986).
441. [d. at 2564 n.2. See also Appellant's Brief at 7, MacDonald, Sommer & Frates
v. County of Yolo, 106 S. Ct. 2561 (1986) (No. 84-2105).
442. Appellant's Brief at 6, MacDonald, Sommer & Frates, 106 S. Ct. 2561 (1986)
(No. 84-2105).
443. [d. at 7.
444. [d.
445. MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 106 S. Ct. 2561, 2568-69
(1986).
446. [d. at 2565-67, 2567 n. 2.
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the County and Davis would have tolerated in order to avoid a
taking claim. If both stonewalled, the letter would have at least
fixed the date of exhaustion of remedies and of the taking:
the taking date would have been the date of the letter plus a
reasonable response time.
The County and the City, at this juncture, could also have
considered marketworthy alternatives: reduction of taxes, TDRs,
offers to allow development if the owner installed services,m or
vesting of future development rights, perhaps at levels lower
than requested.
In any resulting litigation, satisfaction of the exhaustion requirement would have forced the courts to consider a taking on
its merits. Applying the action versus intent standard in light of
surrounding circumstances (property condition, social and economic conditions, the course of the government's conduct) the
court might well have found a taking: Davis' acts clearly prohibited any residential use in light of the County's requirements
and vice versa.
Had a taking been found, the case would have been remanded to the appropriate superior court which would order the
County and Davis to issue Certificates of Alternate Use, to establish the minimal use level which would remove the taking,
and to declare their intent to rescind, condemn or effect a prospective taking of up to ten years.
In the event of either rescission or a prospective taking, the
court would use the Certificate to set compensation levels based
on the option or rental value of the land for the period of the
taking. In a prospective taking, the compensation would be reassessed each year. At the end of ten years, the land would be
deemed subject to the use indicated on the Certificate if the government did not decide to condemn. In a condemnation, the
owner would be compensated at the market value of the property at the use level indicated on the Certificate.
Marketworthy alternatives approved by the court could be
447. But note: the owners had offered to do 80. See Appellant's Brief at 6, MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 106 S. Ct. 2561 (1986) (No. 84-2105).
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used at this point to offset some or all of the compensation due,
subject to court approval and reasonably non-speculative value.
The County could, for' example, suppress property taxes for a
designated period or pay for the installation of municipal services such as sewer hook-ups which the developer would otherwise bear. The burden of proving the value of marketworthy alternatives would be on the government.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Fifth Amendment does not distinguish between takings
that are a result of eminent domain and those that occur because of regulation. 448 A taking is that which takes. 449 A unified
approach to takings is mandated by the Constitution and by notions of fundamental fairness. By identifying the property interest involved, using circumstantial review, clarifying when administrative remedies have been exhausted and standardizing
valuation, regulatory takings can be treated like the acts of eminent domain they really are. It is time to find the quark.
End Note. In June, 1987, the Supreme Court made two major contributions to the law of regulatory takings: it held that
invalidation did not relieve government of the duty to compensate where its activity has taken all use of property,4IiO and that a
condition on the. use of property must be related to a specific
legislative purpose. 461
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v.
County of Los Angeles 41S2 was the product of a county flood control ordinance adopted after spring floods ravaged canyonlands
in the Angeles National Forest. The ordinance prohibited all
building in the flood cohtrol zone, preventing the plaintiff from
rebuilding a church camp destroyed in the floods. 41S3 The California Court of Appeals assumed that the complaint sought dam448. Bauman, supra note 26, at 49.
449. Id.
450. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 55 U.S.L.W. 4781, 4786 (U.S. June 9, 1987).
451. Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 55 U.S.L.W. 5145, 5148 (U.S. June
23, 1987).
452. 55 U.S.L.W. 4781 (U.S. June 9, 1987).
453. [d. at 4782.
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ages for an uncompensated taking of all use, and denied relief on
the basis of Agins u. Tiburon,""" concluding that the remedy for
a taking was limited to nonmonetary relief.""" Isolation of the
remedial question allowed the Supreme Court to bypass the
usual stumbling blocks: exhaustion of remedies and definition of
the taking. ""6
In Nollan u. California Coastal Commission,m the Court
was confronted with an attack on a condition to a building permit issued by the Coastal Commission. The Commission required dedication of a public beach access easement in exchange
for a permit to enlarge an existing residence. m The Supreme
Court rejected the condition because it was not related to the
original purpose of the building restriction. ""9 The Commission,
allegedly concerned about the public's visual access to the coast,
failed to convince the Court that taking a physical access easement in exchange for a permit to block visual access advanced
its primary purpose. 460 Absent a nexus between purpose and
condition, the Commission's acts amounted to extortion, to a
taking of property for which it must pay.461
Although significant, the June decisions ignore important
taking issues and raise new questions. For example, neither case
addresses exhaustion of remedies, and neither tackles the thorny
issue of defining a regulatory taking. First Church refers to such
a taking as "deprivation of all use".462 However, the Court
merely assumed a taking and never dealt with the question of
when an owner has been deprived of all use. 463 Nollan found exaction of the easement a taking by analogy to physical invasion
cases such as Loretto u. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV,"64 and
454. 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1979).
455. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 55 U.S.L.W. 4781, 4783 (U.S. June 9, 1987).
456. [d. at 4783-84.
457. 55 U.S.L.W. 5145 (U.S. June 23, 1987).
458. [d. at 5145.
459. [d. at 5148.
460. [d.
461. [d.

462. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 55 U.S.L.W. 4781, 4785 (U.S. June 9, 1987).
463. [d. at 4783-84.
464. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
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to principles of extortion,46~ concepts easier to manipulate than
those involved in downzoning. In fact, instead of clarifying taking standards, Nollan complicates them. It adopts both the
nexus requirement466 and stricter scrutiny of police power regulations which affect property.467 Apparently abandoning the
usual deference to exercises of the police power which are rationally related to a legitimate state interest, the Court demands
that such an exercise substantially advance a public interest
where it abridges property rights. 468 Unfortunately, it does not
clarify whether investment-backed expectations are a property
right, leaving planners to wonder whether and at what point a
developer's reliance on preliminary approvals will trigger this
stricter scrutiny.
The two cases leave the issue of compensation largely unresolved. First Church seems to indicate that the leasehold value
of the regulated property should be used as a basis for calculating compensation,469 but does not resolve whether such value is
to be based on the best and highest use of the property or something less. It holds that compensation is due for the entire period of time that a regulation denies an owner all use of his
property,470 but excludes "preliminary activity" from the taking
period. 471 Its failure to define preliminary activity adds another
complication to the compensation picture: it is less clear than
.ever how the duration of the taking should be calculated.
Neither case addresses the use of marketworthy alternatives to
cold cash. While Nollan deals unfavorably with the use of exactions by the state as a condition to development, it does not discuss the converse situation where government provides an owner
special privileges or offsets in exchange for development restrictions on his property.
The regulatory taking impasse is far from resolved. Justice
Stevens warned in his Nollan dissent that land-use planners are
465. Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 55 U.S.L.W. 5145, 5146, 5148 (U.S.
June 23, 1987).
466. [d. at 5148.
467. [d. at 5149.
468. [d.
469. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 55 U.S.L.W. 4781, 4785-86 (U.S. June 9, 1987).
470. [d. at 4786.
471. [d.
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left guessing "how the Court will react to the next case, and the
one after that."472 In fact, all sides are left guessing. The unified
field theory still needs more work.
Barbara J. Savery *

472. Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 55 U.S.L.W. 5145, 5156 (U.S. June
23, 1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
• Third year law student (Class of 1988), Golden Gate University School of Law.
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